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Abstract 
Transaction costs play a key role in the behaviour of smallholders in developing countries. 
We exploit the quasi experimental design of the introduction of an additional tobacco auction 
floor in Malawi in order to investigate the impact of a reduction in transaction costs and 
improved market access on yield and underlying smallholder’s decisions on production and 
area of tobacco, the major cash crop in Malawi. Estimations are based on annual data by 
Extension Planning Area, 198 in total, fully covering Malawi, for 2003-04 to 2009-10. The 
estimation results support a statistically significant positive impact of the introduction of a 
new auction floor on tobacco yield and production of smallholders. Yield increases over the 
years to 21-25% above base year level. Smallholder production increases are of a similar size 
with a larger variation, ranging from 12% to 30%. The evidence further suggests that 
smallholder area is not affected. Results are shown to be robust after controlling for rainfall, 
fertilizer use, tobacco prices, maize prices and after including the lagged dependent variable. 
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Introduction 
Smallholders in developing countries can choose to produce food crops for home 
consumption or cash crops for the market1. High production costs, high transaction costs, and 
high risks of output and input prices often make subsistence farming – food production for 
home consumption – the optimal choice (see e.g. De Janvry et al. 1991; Jayne, 1994; 
Fafchamps, 1999; Key et al., 2000)2. Widespread subsistence farming leads to low 
productivity and low growth in agriculture. And since developing countries have large 
agricultural sectors with  a comparative advantage vis-à-vis non-agricultural sectors, large 
multiplier effects from agriculture to the remaining sectors of the economy and few 
alternative growth strategies (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2010), a stagnant agricultural sector is 
likely to obstruct the economic growth potential of these countries.  
The question arises how one can overcome this subsistence trap? A possible way out 
of this trap is to reduce transaction costs for smallholders. Transaction costs – costs incurred 
in order to sell agricultural output on the market – include costs of information,  collection, 
loading, transport, bargaining, monitoring, insurance and other costs associated with access to 
market. It is claimed that transaction costs are large and a major cause of not selling on the 
market. Conversely, (improved) access to markets – both the mere existence of markets but 
also the logistical and marketing infrastructure that facilitates agricultural crop sales on these 
markets – decrease transactions costs and thereby potentially trigger smallholders to produce 
for the market. 
To analyse this latter claim empirically we exploit the quasi experimental design of 
the introduction of an additional tobacco auction floor in  Malawi, on top of the three already 
                                                            
1 Food crops are not necessarily or exclusively used for subsistence, but may also be sold on the market. 
2  Promotion of either food crops or commercial crops also lies at the heart of policy discussions (see e.g. 
Harrigan, 2003, 2008). 
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existing auction floors. We investigate the size of the impact of reducing transaction costs on 
smallholders’ tobacco area and tobacco production decisions. Tobacco in Malawi is – with a 
distance – the major cash crop, grown throughout the country and by regulation exclusively 
sold on auctions. Malawi does not have a domestic cigarette industry and, hence, all tobacco 
is exported. In the 2000/01 season realised transaction costs in Malawi tobacco are claimed to 
be in the range of 14.5% to 22.5% of the sales value (see FAO, 2003). This estimate of 
transaction costs is likely to be downward biased, as it omits unobserved costs.  
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 1 we present an overview of the 
literature on the role of market access and transaction costs in developing countries. In 
Section 2 we describe developments in the Malawi tobacco industry: we discuss the 
importance of tobacco for the Malawi economy, the transition from estate based to 
smallholder based tobacco production over the past decades, the marketing institutions in the 
tobacco commodity chain and we show what we can learn from auction transaction data. In 
Section 3 we show how we plan to measure the impact of improved market access for 
tobacco smallholders in Malawi. In Section 4 we present and discuss the estimation results. In 
Section 5 we give the summary and conclusion of this paper. 
 
1. Market access and transaction costs in the literature 
In this section we discuss the literature that studies how transaction costs affect market 
participation and behaviour of farmers. Part of this literature is structural in nature and 
attempts to explain the decision to grow either subsistence crops or cash crops, and the 
decision to participate in the market. What drives farmers to grow low yielding food crops for 
home consumption rather than high return cash crops for the market? And what explains that 
large groups of farmers prefer not to participate in the market? De Janvry, Fafchamps and 
Sadoulet (1991) discuss the implications of market failure in food markets, cash crop markets 
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and labor markets, by assessing the effects of shocks and compare these with the case of 
complete markets. Their exercise makes clear that under market failures households have a 
tendency to get trapped into self sufficiency. Limited participation in the market also explains 
a sluggish supply response. Goetz (1992) develops a model where the decision of a food 
producing household is split up in a decision to enter the market and trade, and a decision how 
much to trade conditional on participating on the market as a buyer or seller. Three groups are 
identified: seller, buyers and non-participants. A switching regressing estimation strategy is 
proposed along these lines, and empirically applied to household survey data for Senegal. 
Improved market information for households is shown to significantly raise the probability of 
participation. Jayne (1994) argues that high costs related to purchasing food on the market 
make cash crop production unattractive, despite higher returns of cash crops on the farm. The 
wedge between producer prices of home produced maize and consumer prices of maize 
purchased in the market drives the decision to cultivate food crops rather than cash crops, and 
this wedge is especially large in rural areas. On the basis of smallholder survey data of five 
semi arid Zimbabwean areas for 1990 it is shown that consumers prices need to decrease with 
5% to 30% to make cash crop production attractive. Omamo (1998) uses a household model 
with transport costs to explain why farmers in the Kenyan Siaya District allocate larger shares 
of land to low yielding food crops rather than high return cash crops. Simulations of the optimal 
choice between cash crops and food crops and incorporating transport costs are shown to do a 
better job in generating empirically observed cropping patterns and confirm that transport costs 
alone are sufficient for these results. In other words: food dominated cropping patterns are 
optimal responses to high transport costs between farms and markets and uncertainty and risk 
aversion is not required for this purpose. Key et al. (2000) extend and generalize the model 
proposed by Goetz (1992) that explains that some farmers sell on the market, some buy on the 
market and some do not participate, by incorporating proportional and fixed transaction costs 
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into an agricultural household model of supply response. Supply is shown to depend on 
proportional transaction costs and market participation on fixed transaction costs, which allows 
identification of both types of transaction costs. Empirical estimations, based on data of 
Mexican corn producers, indicate that both types of transaction costs matter, both for sellers 
and buyers. They find on the basis of their empirical work that 60% of the supply response to a 
price increase is due to producers who enter the sales market, while 40% is due to those 
producers who are already sellers on the market. Reduction of transaction costs is concluded to 
be an important complement in improving supply response. Using a similar model as 
developed by Key et al. (2000),  Renkow et al. (2004) investigate – on the basis of data of 
rural households in Kenya – to what extent autarkic households need to be compensated with 
higher market prices to offset the fixed transaction costs that are made to either sell or buy on 
the market. They find that the ad valorem tax equivalent of fixed transactions costs is 15%. 
They assert on the basis of their results that public investment in reducing transaction costs 
may well hold a greater potential for poverty alleviation than additional agricultural research.  
This completes the review of attempts to offer structural models to explain subsistence 
farming3. There is another line of recent research that makes use of impact evaluation 
techniques (see e.g. Duflo et al., 2007) and that is less concerned with developing structural 
models on transaction costs. This literature has focused on a specific type of transaction costs, 
notably information and search costs and aims to show the importance of information for the 
                                                            
3  This literature review is highly selective.  Alternative structural models are proposed. For example, Cadot et al. 
(2006) approach the “commercial versus subsistence farming” issue from a different angle. They use a simple 
asset-return model of occupational choice in order to provide estimates of the cost of moving out of subsistence 
farming. The model is applied to data of Madagascar farmers. They find that the entry cost associated with moving 
out of subsistence are in the range of 124% to 153% of subsistence farmers’ annual production. Several other 
contributions in this area reveal interesting characteristics and insights of marketing behavior of farmers, 
transaction costs, food prices and domestic trade in developing countries. Interesting work concerns e.g. 
Fafchamps et al., 2005;  Fafchamps and Vargas Hill, 2005, and Minten and Kyle, 1999. 
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proper functioning of markets. The empirical studies therefore focus for a large part on the 
introduction of mobile phone services, how this new information technology has impacted on 
access to and costs of information (search costs), on market prices and on economic behavior4. 
Often the introduction of mobile phone coverage is used for the identification of impacts, but 
also experimental designs are documented. Jensen (2007) makes use of micro level survey data 
to show that price dispersion on fish markets  in Kerala, India has dramatically reduced after 
the introduction of mobile phones. This change is claimed to have established a nearly perfect 
adherence to the Law of One Price.  The evidence further supports increased fishermen’s 
profits and consumer welfare due to mobile phones. The gains from mobile phones services are 
not exclusively reserved for the wealthy but are shown to be shared by smaller and poorer 
fishermen as well. Easy and timely access to information is also shown to prevent waste, 
inefficiency and spoilage of production of perishable crops (Jensen, 2007; see also Muto and 
Yamano, 2009, on bananas).  Aker(2010)  uses market and trader level data to estimate the 
impact of mobile phones on price dispersion across grain markets in Niger. The empirical 
evidence on the introduction of mobile phone services in Niger between 2001 and 2006 
supports a 10 to 16% reduction in price dispersion. The reduction in price dispersion is shown 
to be stronger for market pairs with higher transport costs. Reduction in price dispersion is also 
shown to be larger once a critical mass of market pairs has mobile phone coverage.  Reduction 
in search costs and inter market price dispersion is associated with improvements in trader and 
consumer welfare. The lower reduction in price dispersion compared to Jensen (2007) is 
attributed to better storability of grain and lesser perishability than fish. Along similar lines 
Muto and Yamano (2009) investigate the reduction in marketing costs of agricultural 
                                                            
4 Despite the emphasis in empirical work on mobile phone technology and information and 
search costs, there are also a few contributions that make use of other changes in the marketing 
channel that affect transaction costs. 
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commodities due to the introduction of a mobile phone network in Uganda using household 
data for 2003 and 2005. They investigate marketing and trade of maize and bananas and find 
that the improved information due to mobile phone coverage has induced market participation 
of farmers in remote areas  who produce bananas.  Their study does not find impacts of mobile 
phone expansion on maize marketing. Mobile phone services cannot avoid potential 
asymmetric information between traders and farmers, and thereby block potential benefits for 
farmers. Farmers’ organizations are suggested to tackle this problem and to strengthen the 
bargaining power of farmers.   Fafchamps and Minten (2012) estimate the benefits for farmers 
of SMS based agricultural information in Maharashtra, India, using a randomized controlled 
trial.  The information includes prices, weather forecasts, crop advice and new items. They find 
no effect of this service on the prices received by farmers, value added, crop losses, crop 
choices and cultivation practices. These disappointing and somewhat disturbing results are in 
line with the limited commercial take-up of the information service, but difficult to reconcile 
with previous investigations on the impact of information, as documented above. A 
comparative advantage in transport is suggested as an explanation why benefits accrue in the 
first place to traders and not to producers. Finally, we discuss – as an example of a change in 
marketing services rather than mobile phone services – Goyal (2012) who investigates the 
impact of a change in marketing of a major private company in the soy market in the central 
Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. The company aimed at an improvement in procurement 
efficiency of soybeans to be achieved by the creation of a direct marketing channel (internet 
kiosks and warehouses) and by a reduction in transaction costs. After the introduction of kiosks 
and warehouse prices of soybean increased, price dispersion decreased and area under soy 
cultivation increased.  This study highlights the benefits from direct interaction between 
producers and processors in agricultural marketing. For a full welfare assessment, however, the 
loss to traders needs to be quantified. 
8 
 
In summary, we find persuasive and rigorous evidence in the literature, both theoretical 
and empirical, of the key role that transaction costs play in explaining subsistence farming and 
on the impact of transaction costs on prices, arbitrage and economic behavior. The current 
paper aims to complement this literature by investigating the impact of market access – caused 
by the introduction of a new auction floor – on the household decision to grow a cash crop. For 
this purpose we look at tobacco production in Malawi. Tobacco in Malawi is – with a distance 
– the major cash crop, grown in nearly all districts5 and exclusively sold on auctions. In 2004 
an additional auction floor started operations in Chinkhoma, Kasungu district, on top of the 
three already existing and operational auction floors (respectively in Limbe (Blantyre), 
Kanengo (Lilongwe) and Mzuzu (Mzimba); see Appendix B for a map of Malawi with the 
locations of the auction floors). We claim that the introduction of this new auction floor 
establishes a natural experiment: a comparison of supply response of those producers who did 
and those who did not benefit from this new auction floor provides a measure of the impact 
of market access. For the empirical measurement of impact we make use of (aggregate) 
annual area and production data of smallholders at Extension Planning Area level (EPA). There 
is a total of 198 EPAs, covering the whole of Malawi, for a period of seven years, from 2003 
to 2009. Prior to elaborating the research methodology and presenting the impact results we 
give an overview of the Malawi tobacco industry. 
 
2. The Malawi tobacco industry 
Various articles and publications describe market developments in the Malawi tobacco sector, 
the marketing and regulatory infrastructure that evolved over time and the (nearly complete)  
transformation that took place from estate based to smallholder based (see e.g. Kydd and 
                                                            
5 The southern districts of Chikwawa and Nsanja have negligible tobacco cultivation. Additionally there are a 
few EPAs in other districts that report zero tobacco area and tobacco production. 
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Christiansen, 1982; Orr, 2000; Jaffee, 2003; World Bank, 2004; Poulton et al., 2007; Tchale 
and Keyser, 2010). Rather than making repeated references we note that we draw extensively 
on these sources to highlight the key developments and events which are relevant to the 
subsequent analysis. Complementary to this description we analyse the 2009 transaction data of 
the all Malawi tobacco auctions. 
The role of tobacco in the domestic economy of Malawi 
Tobacco is the major export product of Malawi accounting for a share of 45 to 65% of total 
merchandise exports (1994 to 2009, NSO data). The second largest single export product 
(either tea or sugar) is only a fraction of tobacco exports. The contribution of tobacco to 
GDP, measured as the export value of tobacco in terms of GDP, varies from 9 to 16% (1994 
to 2009, NSO data). Tobacco is cultivated by 19% of the smallholder households, around 
375,000 farmers (2004). The bulk of the tobacco growing households is poor or ultra poor 
(around 65% (Economic Council, 2000)). Smallholder crop area allocated to tobacco varies 
from 120,000 to 185,000 hectare, and smallholder crop production from 90 to 210 thousand 
tons, both in the period from 2003 to 2010 (source: Agro Economic Survey, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Security). Using the methodology employed in FAO (2003), direct 
employment in tobacco production and marketing (including processing, transport, 
auctioning and research) varies from 11 to 19% of total labor supply6 during 2000-2009.  
Tobacco exports generate a major contribution to total government tax revenue in the 
form of withholding tax levied at the auctions (respectively 7% with exemptions for sales 
below 600000 MK, and from 2010 onwards 3% without exemption), export tax (in 1995, 
government imposes a 10% export tax on tobacco leaves, reduced to 8% in 1996, then to 4% 
                                                            
6 The estimate of direct employment in tobacco production and marketing depends both on the applied tobacco 
data (MoAFS, FAO), the labor supply data (population between 20 and 60) and how employment is related to 
area and production. 
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in 1997)  and most importantly export surrender requirements imposed by the Reserve Bank 
of Malawi (till 1994 60%, and from 1994 onwards 40%). All tobacco taxes and levies add up 
to a share of 30% in 2000 decreasing to around 20% in 2008 of total government tax revenue 
(Jaffee (2003) reports 23%; FAO (2003) reports: “…tax accounted for more than 20 percent 
of total national tax revenue”)7.  
In summary the figures indicate that tobacco is of extraordinary importance to the 
Malawi economy. It is likely that the role of tobacco extends well beyond these figures. 
Malawi’s export of tobacco is also claimed to be the major driver of economic growth (see e.g. 
Lea and Hammer, 2009). 
Tobacco cultivation in Malawi: from colonial heritage to smallholder domination 
The Special Crops Act of 1964 continued pre-independence existing restrictions, that made the 
cultivation of tobacco the exclusive domain of estates. A new government – elected in 1993 
and following an era of one party rule since independence – shifted the policy stance to a more 
broad based economic growth aiming at poverty alleviation. Under the new government – but 
also because of pressure by donors to liberalise the tobacco industry – amendments to the 
Special Crop Act were realised which allowed smallholders to grow burley tobacco (Jaffee, 
2003). In the course of the 1990s, these developments have given rise to a complete 
transformation from estate based tobacco cultivation with a high share of western type 
tobacco’s (Flue Cured, NDDF, SDDF, Sunair), to a smallholder  based tobacco cultivation 
with a high and dominant share of burley tobacco (see Figure 1). The changes in regulation 
laid the foundation for this transformation. High profitability of tobacco as a cash crop – the 
only really remunerative cash crop available to smallholders – and the broad spread of 
                                                            
7 The large share of tobacco proceeds that flows to the Government of Malawi jeopardizes GoMs credibility in 
defending the interests of  smallholders farmers in their annually revolving claim against too low prices offered 
by colluding buyers at the auctions.  
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technical knowledge on tobacco cultivation – since many farmers worked previously on 
estates as labourers – triggered high growth of smallholder tobacco production. The increase 
of smallholder production was further supported by the formation of burley clubs, the 
introduction of intermediate buyers who provided the logistical link from farmers to auction 
floors8 and the availability of credit to smallholders provided by the Malawi Rural Finance 
Company (Jaffee, 2003). Simultaneously the more labour, capital and input intensive quality 
tobacco’s, mainly grown by large estates, were quickly losing commercial viability because 
of high production costs (labour, fuel wood and investment).  
Since all tobacco exported from Malawi is required to be sold at auction (see also 
below), unit values and sales volume at auctions can be considered to be a good reflection of 
price and production developments in the Malawi tobacco industry9. Over the years, sales 
volume – separated in burley, flue cured and other tobacco’s – shows a nearly continuous 
upward development (see Figure 1). High growth rates in tobacco, however, are entirely on 
account of burley production. Especially, since the end of the 1980s burley sales realize high 
growth rates, which slightly level off by the end of the 1990s. Flue cured production is stagnant 
during the 1980s, declines during the 1990s to reach a production low in 2001, after which year 
a moderate recovery has taken place. Flue cured tobacco is nearly exclusively grown by 
estates. As a result of the higher capital requirements in the form of curing barns and other 
supporting equipment, smallholders are reluctant to take up the production of flue cured 
                                                            
8 The minimum requirement for selling tobacco on the auction was overcome with the introduction of the 
intermediate buyer (FAO, 2003). 
9 Some authors report sales of tobacco from Zambia or Mozambique at Malawi auctions. This is likely to occur 
occasionally but we assume that the size of these sales are relatively small and do not disturb the general 
message of the auction data for the Malawi tobacco industry. 
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tobacco. Hence, it is safe to assume that the decline in sales volume of flue cured tobacco 
since 1990 should be attributed to the collapse of the estate sector10. 
 
Figure 1 Auction Sales Volume and Unit Values of Burley and Other Tobaccoa 
 
a Nominal unit values in US$ cent per kg are on the left axis and sales volume in million tonnes on the right axis. 
Other tobacco’s produced in Malawi are NDDF, SDDF (resp. Northern and Southern Division Dark Fired, so-
called western tobacco’s) and Sun Air; source: annual aggregate data from the Tobacco Control Commission, 
Malawi.  
 
Figure 1 further illustrates distinct periods of increases and decreases in burley prices 
(increasing prices: 1971-1981, 1984-1991, 1994-1996 and 2005-2009; decreasing prices: 1981-
1984, 1991-1994, 1996-2005). Flue cured prices are on average higher than burley prices but 
follow a similar development. Visual inspection of the figure suggests a positive response of 
production to (lagged) auction prices: (lagged) price increases (decreases) coincide with 
                                                            
10 It should be noted that the flue cured-burley divide does not run entirely parallel with the estate-smallholder 
divide as some estates are active in burley production. 
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production increases (decreases) in a remarkably systematic way. This observation is confirmed 
by other work in this area (see e.g. Jaffee, 2003).  
 
 
Tobacco marketing: auctions, regulations, farmers clubs and other institutions 
The tobacco auction system in Malawi has a long history, which dates back to the colonial 
times, at the start of the previous century. In the early days marketing institutions were adapted 
to production and marketing needs of estates. We focus on post-colonial times – Malawi gained 
independence in 1964 – and specifically the period since the start of the 1990s, when the sector 
was liberalized. Transport of tobacco to auctions was – both pre and post liberalization – on 
account of the tobacco farmer. Hence, in the 1990s – in the course of liberalisation of the 
Malawi tobacco industry –  a logistical infrastructure for tobacco transport and marketing from 
rural areas to auctions had to be put in place to service smallholder farmers. A variety of 
institutions and organisations came into being. Of key importance in this context are farmer 
clubs or burley clubs: groups of 10 to 30 farmers that share specific services. Upon registration  
with the Tobacco Control Commission clubs were allocated a quota and were entitled to 
receive burley seed, fertilizer, advice on cultivation and extension support. From 1991/92 
onwards clubs were authorized to sell directly on the auction floors and since 1994 also to 
intermediate buyers (Orr, 2000). Access to auctions and thereby access to world market 
prices, credit facilities and economies of scale in transport are the major incentives for 
smallholders burley growers to join a burley club (Orr, 2000; Negri and Porto, 2008). 
Additionally, the intermediate buyer system was introduced in 1994 to help smallholders to 
transport their burley tobacco to the auctions. The existing Tobacco Association of Malawi 
(TAMA) and the National Association of Smallholders Farmers of Malawi (NASFAM), which 
was established in the 1990s, also assisted in the organisation of collection, storage, transport 
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and sale of smallholder tobacco from rural areas to the auction floors, in cooperation with 
burley clubs, estates and intermediate buyers (see Appendix C for more information on the 
major institutions of tobacco sector in Malawi). Shortcomings to this marketing infrastructure 
– which is continuously developing – were experienced in the area of widely diverging 
transport rates, storage losses and lack of accountability (see Jaffee, 2003).  
Tobacco marketing is regulated by the Tobacco Control Commission (TCC), a 
government statutory body. TCC is responsible for market regulation and control, licensing 
of farmers, quality standards, data and statistics of the tobacco sector and advising the 
government on tobacco issues. Operations on (all) tobacco auction floors are run by a single 
private sector company, the Auction Holdings Limited (AHL). The establishment of an 
auction floor also requires substantial complementary investments from buyers to properly 
organize after sales processing, storage and international transport. As early as 1939 tobacco 
was auctioned only at the Limbe auction floor, near Blantyre in the south of Malawi. In more 
recent years and well after independence the centre of tobacco production moved in northern 
direction. Auction floors were established in 1979 in Kanengo, near Lilongwe in Central 
Malawi; in 1993 in Mzuzu in Northern Malawi; and in 2004 in Chinkhoma in the central 
district Kasungu, between Lilongwe and Mzuzu (see Appendix B for a map of Malawi with 
locations of auction floors and Figure 1 for the timing of the introduction of the auction floor in 
relation with tobacco production and prices). The tobacco auctions normally open from mid-
March and close towards the end of October. Tobacco is packaged in bales with a weight of 
80-90kg. In the 2009 marketing season a total of 2.3 million bales were sold. A total of 
25,000 to 30,000 bales are sold daily amongst the four auction floors. According to weekly 
reports from TCC11 direct trade and contract trade is primarily important for specialty 
tobacco’s (Flue Cured, NDDF and SDDF) and hardly plays a role for burley tobacco. 
                                                            
11 These reports are only available for the period from 2001 to 2006. 
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Moreover, direct trade and contract trade transactions also need to be settled on auctions. 
Sellers that are not satisfied with the contract prices have the opportunity to switch to the 
auction market once. The traditional auction system has four national sales daily: two in 
Lilongwe and one each in Limbe and Mzuzu. The Chinkhoma floor trades twice weekly on 
which days Lilongwe only has one auction sale. The sale of tobacco by auction is concluded 
to the highest bidder. 
On the demand side there is a limited number of companies active, notably Dimon, 
Standard Commercial, Universal Leaf, Limbe Leaf Tobacco Company, Alliance One and 
Premium Tama. Most companies are subsidiaries of large international traders or 
international cigarette manufacturers. Over the years the composition of the buying side has 
changed due to new entrants, mergers and takeovers. However, the degree of concentration 
on the buyer side is high. The presence of only a limited number of buyers on the auction 
floors (7 in 2011) raises suspicion of a lack of competitiveness of tobacco pricing and 
collusion between buyers at the auction floors (see e.g. Otañez at al., 2007). This is 
particularly manifest with occasional outbursts of protest from tobacco farmers who complain 
about the low prices at the auction.   
Auction transactions: comparison of district composition and unit values 
Auction transaction data allow to analyse the composition of sales volume and unit values, by 
auction floor and by district of origin (see Appendix E for an overview of sales volume by 
auction floor and by district of origin)12. A total share of  56.6% of all tobacco sales 
originates from the central districts Kasungu (21.1%) and Dowa (18.3%) and the northern 
district Mzimba (17.2%), comprising the three largest districts of origin in terms of tobacco 
                                                            
12 We use transaction data of all tobacco auction transactions  – a total of around 60,000 transactions – for the 
year 2009, which are kindly made available by the Tobacco Control Commission. The transaction data pertain 
to a year that comes a few years after the introduction of the Chinkhoma auction floor in 2004. 
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volume. Another share of 8.2% is on account of the northern district Rumphi. A few districts 
in the south – Mwanza, Chikwawa and Nsanja – have negligible or no sales.  
The distribution of sales over auctions is as follows: 33.6% of total volume is traded 
on the Mzuzu auction floor, 13.4% on the Chinkhoma auction floor, 26.4% on the Lilongwe 
auction floor and 26.5% on the Limbe auction floor13. The Mzuzu auction floor in the north 
trades in particular tobacco from Mzimba (50%), Rumphi (20%) and Kasungu (13%); the 
Chinkhoma auction floor in the central region trades tobacco from Kasungu (60%), Dowa 
(20%) and Ntchisi (7%); the Lilongwe auction floor, also in the central region, trades tobacco 
from Dowa (54%) and Kasungu (30%); and finally the Limbe auction floor trades tobacco 
from Mangochi (24%), Machinga (19%), Ntcheu (13%) and Phalombe (15%). To a large 
extent these figures reflect the relative importance of nearby production areas. 
All districts in the north and the south – and this is no surprise – transport their 
tobacco almost exclusively to one single auction floor: the Mzuzu auction floor for the 
northern districts and the Limbe auction floor for the southern districts. Central districts with 
the exception of Salima and Ntcheu, spread their sales over two or even three auctions. This 
suggest that the preferred auction of sale is not only determined by distance. In a number of 
districts this is particularly clear: the Limbe auction floor is more popular for tobacco 
produced in the districts Salima, Mchinji and Nkhotakota than the more closely located 
Lilongwe (see Table 1 and Appendix E). This is possibly explained by congestion at the 
                                                            
13 This clearly diverges from the situation at the start of the 2000s when the Kanengo auction was the largest 
auction (see Jaffee, 2003). Also the, most likely outdated,  Limbe Leaf website (accessed in June 2011) reports: 
“The Lilongwe floor facilitates trade of 50% of the national crop, while the Limbe floor accommodates 17%. 
The Mzuzu and Chinkhoma floors make up the remainder of the national crop at 25% and 8% respectively. 
Future patterns indicate that Lilongwe floor's capacity will remain much the same while Mzuzu's and 
Chinkhoma's will increase slightly to the detriment of the Limbe floor”. Our TCC transaction data for 2009 
diverge drastically from these values. We infer from the 2009 TCC data – in terms of future patterns – that 
Mzuzu and Chinkhoma indeed have gained, but also Limbe has gained market share and Lilongwe has lost 
substantial market share. 
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Lilongwe auction floor, cheap transport alternatives from Mchinji and Salima (transport by 
train14) and different prices at auctions (see below). Tobacco farmers from other districts also 
appear to avoid the Lilongwe auction floor (e.g. Ntcheu). Finally, one would expect tobacco 
sales from Mzimba on the Chinkhoma auction floor, which are, however, negligible. This 
may be caused by the (still) moderate trading volume at the Chinkhoma auction floor and the 
– on average – higher prices at Mzuzu auction floor. 
 
Table 1 Burley prices by auction floor of sale and district of origina 
                auction 
district 
Mzuzu Chinkhoma Lilongwe Limbe 
Nkhotakota 1.74   (308) 1.62   (284) 1.39       (8) 1.51   (370) 
Kasungu 1.78 (4576) 1.67 (4453) 1.54 (5040) 1.65 (1146) 
Ntchisi 1.70   (366) 1.61   (949) 1.81     (22) 1.63   (566) 
Dowa 1.72 (1387) 1.60 (2740) 1.54 (8201) 1.58 (1649) 
Mchinji 1.49   (435) 1.45   (652) 1.28     (52) 1.56 (1397) 
Lilongwe 1.72   (370) 1.48   (864) 1.57 (1661) 1.59 (1602) 
Mzimba 1.78 (6812) 1.66 (339) 1.82      (2) 1.52    (78) 
Salima 1.75    (26) 1.68   (31) 1.29      (2) 1.54   (509) 
a The table reports average transaction prices for 2009 in US$ per kg by district of origin, for districts of the Central 
region. Source: transaction data of 2009 from the Tobacco Control Commission. Number of transactions are in 
brackets behind the average price and in case of only a few transactions (and hence less reliable) average prices are 
shaded. 
 
Our primary interest is in districts that sell their tobacco on the Chinkhoma floor, either 
exclusively or combined with sales on other floors. Hence, for these districts we have 
                                                            
14 The Malawi rail network consists of a rail line – with a total within Malawi length of 797 km – running from 
Zambia in the west, via Lilongwe to the south where it splits into a line further south to Blantyre and Beira in 
Mozambique (the Beira corridor), and a line to the east, to Nacala in Mozambique (the Nacala corridor). Both 
Mchinji and Salima have railway stations along the railway line to the south which potentially offers  these 
locations low cost transport services to the Limbe auction floor (Limbe is along the railway line and also has a 
railway station), near Blantyre  in the south. A similar situation applies to tobacco from Ntcheu district. Freight 
data from the Central and East African Railways (CEAR, www.cear.mw) confirm that substantial quantities of 
tobacco are transported from rural areas to auction floors along the railway line, notably Lilongwe and Blantyre 
(these traded quantities are distinct from tobacco transported for export abroad). 
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calculated average unit values of burley tobacco for the different auctions (see Table 1). The 
table indicates that the highest average prices for burley are realized on the Mzuzu auction 
floor, while the lowest average prices are realized on the Lilongwe auction floor. From the 
perspective of realized auction prices the Chinkhoma auction floor offers an attractive 
alternative outlet to the Lilongwe auction floor. 
 
Figure 2 Tobacco export unit values, auction prices and farm gate prices  
(US$ per 1000 kg, nominal) 
 
Source: FAOSTAT, TCC and Agro-Economic Survey (MoAFS) 
 
Another issue that deserves attention are the different prices in the tobacco commodity chain. 
How do Malawi tobacco export unit values, auction prices and farm gate prices compare? 
Annual observations for tobacco export unit values, auction prices and farm gate prices are 
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shown in Figure 215. The figure reveals a tremendous gap between farm gate prices and auction 
prices: auction prices are more than twice as high relative to farm gate prices – well in excess of 
the 15 to 23% transaction costs – or, conversely farm gate prices are 24% to 46% of auction 
prices. Such producer shares in market prices are small but not uncommon16. However, in the 
case of Malawi it is not certain if this gap can be fully explained by transaction costs. At 
auctions tobacco is sold directly by farmers or their representative grower clubs. Hence, next to 
transaction costs the gap is likely to represent a premium for farmers or farmer clubs. Even if 
we take account of such a premium, the gap remains large.  
The difference between auction prices and export unit values is captured by two 
components: value addition from ‘after auction’ processing and export tax. On the basis of 
annual aggregate value and volume data of tobacco export and tobacco auction sales for the 
years 1980 to 2009, we compute that – on average – around 18% of tobacco production volume 
is lost due to after-auction-withdrawal or rejection for export, losses in after-auction-
processing, after-auction-diversion for domestic use and non-registered exports. After auction 
tax consists of withholding tax imposed at the auctions (7% with an exemption for transaction 
below 600,000 MK; and from 2010 onwards 3% without exemption)  and an export surrender 
requirement to the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM; 60% before 1994 and 40% after 1994). 
Value addition is determined by change in the product quality due to after-auction processing, 
by the market power of international tobacco buyers, by export tax policy and by world market 
prices. Our calculations indicate a drastic increase in value addition after the 1994 export tax 
                                                            
15  It should be noted that each of these prices originates from a different source: export unit values are from 
FAOSTAT, auction prices are from Tobacco Control Commission and farm gate prices are from the Agro 
Economic Survey from the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security. 
16 Low producer prices are not uncommon, especially not in large countries. E.g. for the former Zaire, Minten 
and Kyle (1999) demonstrate on the basis of data from a traders’ survey that transportation costs explain most of 
the differences in food prices between producer regions and that road quality is an major determinant of 
transportation costs. They report similarly low producer prices for former Zaire. 
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change: this shift of rent extraction from tobacco sales from the government of Malawi to the 
international tobacco buyers / processors awaits further investigation. 
 
3. Methodology  
Estimating Impact of Interventions with Panel Data 
The impact of an intervention is estimated using a fairly standard and straightforward 
framework for impact evaluation with panel data (see e.g. Duflo et al., 2007). A reasonably 
general specification to estimate the dynamic impact of an intervention with a panel of 
observations runs as follows: 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ  ߚ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚଵ௧௧ ܫ௜௧ ൅  ∑ ߚଶ௞௞ ܺ௞,௜௧ ൅ ߮௜ ൅ ߱௧      (1) 
where  ௜ܻ௧ is the outcome indicator, ܫ௜௧ is a binary intervention variable with a unit value in case 
of an intervention and zero elsewhere (hence, zero before the intervention and without 
intervention), ܺ௞,௜௧ is a set of k exogenous covariates, and  ߮௜ and  ߱௧ are not observed time 
invariant and location (household) invariant effects. The coefficients of the intervention 
variable (ߚଵ௧) is the parameter of interest. We allow impacts to vary over time, thereby 
increasing the flexibility of the specification and the informational content of the data. 
Covariates (ܺ௞,௜௧) may also include observed time-invariant and location (household) invariant 
fixed effects.  
We investigate the impact of (a reduction in) transaction costs on yield and on crop 
area and crop production decisions of tobacco smallholders in Malawi that arises with the 
introduction of a new auction floor. Farmers’ area and production decisions are both driven 
by expected profits, and a changes in transaction costs changes expected profits. We claim 
that the introduction of a new auction floor improves markets access and leads to a reduction 
of transaction costs, in the first place by a reduction in transport costs. The resulting increase 
in expected profits will trigger increases in tobacco production and larger allocations of crop 
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area to tobacco. The reduction in transaction costs consists of the mere availability of a 
nearby marketing opportunity – an opportunity which did not exist previously – and it 
consists of the reduction in transport costs. Transport costs are for a large part proportional to 
distance, and, likewise, there will be a component proportional to distance and a fixed 
component in transaction costs. Consequently, a possible increase in production of tobacco or 
a possible increase in area allocated to tobacco, as a result of the introduction of a new 
auction floor, is likely to be larger for locations that are nearer to the newly established 
auction. In the specification we investigate if changes are correlated with distance by using 
the inverse of the distance to newly established auction as intervention variable, provided that 
this auction has become the nearest auction17.  
௜ܻ௧ ൌ  ߚ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚଵ௧௧ ܫ௜௧ ൅ ∑ ߚଶ௧௧ ሺ1/݀௡௘௔௥௘௦௧  ௔௨௖௧௜௢௡ሻܫ௜௧ ൅ ∑ ߚଷ௞௞ ܺ௞,௜௧ ൅ ߮௜ ൅ ߱௧    (2) 
We may difference equation (3) to sweep out time invariant observed and unobserved 
location (household) fixed effects, represented in the equation by ߮௜. Since differencing 
sacrifices one year of observations, we rather maintain the equation in levels and control for 
(un)observed fixed effects by including a complete set of location dummies.  
Impact of market access to the Malawi tobacco sector: empirical specification 
We implement the framework set out in the previous section to estimate the impact of the 
introduction of a new auction floor in Malawi (the intervention) on yield, production and area 
of tobacco. The exercise aims to measure if and to what extent this intervention has given rise 
to changes in yield, and if these changes correspond with changes in production, area or both. 
Hence, we measure the supply effect of market access. In order to transform equation (3) to an 
equation that can be estimated empirically, we simply insert tobacco yield, tobacco area and 
tobacco production as outcome indicator and add error terms:  
                                                            
17 The condition that the auction has become the nearest auction, is automatically controlled for if interacted 
with the intervention variable. 
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ݕ௜௧ ൌ  ߙ଴ ൅ ∑ ߙଵ௧௧  ܫ௜௧ ൅  ∑ ߙଶ௧௧ ሺ1/݀௡௘௔௥௘௦௧  ௔௨௖௧௜௢௡ሻ ܫ௜௧ ൅ ∑ ߙଷ௞௞ ܺ௞,௜௧ ൅  ߠ௜ ൅ ߴ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧  
          (3a) 
ݍ௜௧/ݍ௜଴ ൌ  ߛ଴ ൅ ∑ ߛଵ௧௧  ܫ௜௧ ൅ ∑ ߛଶ௧௧ ሺ1/݀௡௘௔௥௘௦௧  ௔௨௖௧௜௢௡ሻ ܫ௜௧ ൅  ∑ ߛଷ௞௞ ܺ௞,௜௧ ൅ ߮௜ ൅ ߱௧ ൅ ߤ௜௧   
          (3b) 
ܽ௜௧/ܽ௜଴ ൌ  ߜ଴ ൅ ∑ ߜଵ௧௧  ܫ௜௧ ൅ ∑ ߜଶ௧௧ ሺ1/݀௡௘௔௥௘௦௧  ௔௨௖௧௜௢௡ሻ ܫ௜௧ ൅  ∑ ߜଷ௞௞ ܺ௞,௜௧ ൅  ߩ௜ ൅ ߬௧ ൅ ߥ௜௧
          (3c) 
Where ݕ௜௧, ݍ௜௧ and  ܽ௜௧ are tobacco yield, production and area of EPA i in year t, ݍ௜଴ and  ܽ௜଴ 
are base period tobacco production and base period area of EPA i, and ߝ௜௧, ߤ௜௧ and ߥ௜௧ are error 
terms with zero mean and constant variance. Yield is in kilogram per hectare and can directly 
be compared between different EPAs. Tobacco production is kilogram and crop area in hectare. 
To make tobacco production and crop area comparable between locations, we have expressed 
these dependent variables relative to their pre-intervention or base period level18. All outcome 
variables are transformed into natural logarithms. We use the specifications of equation (3a) to 
(3c) as the basic specification of our estimations, with appropriate restrictions on coefficients. 
The restrictions are apparent from the tables with estimation results.  
A variety of additional covariates ܺ௞,௜௧ is used: in case of the area equation potential 
candidates are previous year tobacco prices, available labour and number of tobacco clubs. 
Both tobacco area and production are likely to respond to previous year auction prices (see 
Figure 1 in this study, but also Jaffee, 2003). Price series on tobacco by auction are not 
available, let alone prices by location of origin, and we have to approximate prices at EPA level 
with national average auction prices19. We make nominal tobacco prices comparable over time 
                                                            
18 We have used the years 2003-2004, 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 or combinations of these years as base period. 
Estimation results are robust for different specifications of the base period. 
19 We do have auction transaction data for one year (2009) but unfortunately we do not have auction transaction 
data for all the years of the sample (from 2003 to 2010). Hence, we use national aggregate prices, averaged over 
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by expressing these prices relative to nominal maize prizes, the major food crop. As we do have 
maize market prices on EPA level this creates variation in the price variable between EPAs. 
Additionally, tobacco, the major cash crop, is also competing with maize on the production 
side. Available labour by EPA is approximated with population by EPA. Since population 
variables do not change much over time, this variable is likely to interact with the EPA fixed 
effects. Data on tobacco clubs by EPA are available for a few years.  
In case of the production equation we may select the same additional covariates, 
however, with different coefficients. A number of other covariates are peculiar to production 
and need to be added. Climatic variables, most notably rainfall, are likely to correlate with 
production outcomes. Fertilizer inputs used in the cultivation of tobacco need to be added as 
well. Agronomic sources acknowledge the importance of NPK applications in tobacco 
cultivation. Estimations of tobacco production functions on the basis of district data (not 
documented) support a significant correlation of both chemical fertilizer (NPK) and rainfall on 
tobacco production.   
Identification of intervention locations 
Locations that benefit from the introduction of the new auction floor in Chinkhoma in 2004 
(the intervention group) are identified by determining the minimum of the distances from each 
location to the different auction floors. For a number of locations the Chinkhoma auction floor 
becomes the closest auction floor. Practically this implies that all locations in the districts 
Kasungu and Nkhotakota,  a large part of locations in the districts Ntchisi, Dowa  and Mchinji, 
and a few in the district Mzimba are intervention locations. In all this concerns 31 locations, 
15.3% of all locations. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
auctions and over districts and we hope that maize prices (that do vary by EPA) and EPA dummies pick-up the 
differences (in tobacco prices) by EPA. 
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The distribution of sales by district of origin (see Appendix E) suggests the Chinkhoma 
auction floor also attracts tobacco outside these districts. This motivates to identify an 
additional set of locations that potentially benefits from the new auction floor. There are a 
number of other locations where the new auction floor at Chinkhoma has become the second 
closest auction floor. In case the difference in distance between the closest and the second 
closest auction floor is small – say less than around 50 km – we have included those locations 
to the intervention group as well. These latter locations are included to the group of intervention 
locations since the difference in transaction costs between the closest and the second closest 
auction floor is negligible and consequently other issues may determine the preferred auction 
floor. The obvious practical example is the high cost of congestion at the Kanengo auction floor 
in Lilongwe. But also the different sales prices at different auction floors could motivate 
producers to sell elsewhere (see Table 1 in this paper20). Moreover, inaccuracies in the 
measurement of distance justify to use a certain margin for the identification of intervention 
locations. On these grounds we have identified another 17 locations, summing to a number of 
48 locations (24%), out of a total of 198 locations, that potentially benefit from the newly 
established auction floor. 
Instrumenting the intervention  
The choice of location of the new tobacco auction floor is not the result of a random 
assignment. The auction company will have carefully considered several alternatives and 
investigated the optimal location for doing this investment, basing its eventual choice on an 
assessment of current and expected turnover of tobacco and long run profit potential. 
Consequently, causality may not run (only) from market access to decisions of tobacco 
                                                            
20  As a matter of fact, the price differences may motivate producers from the district Mzimba to sell their 
tobacco at the Mzuzu auction floor, because realized prices at this auction are higher than those at the 
Chinkhoma auction floor.  
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growers, but also the other way around, from (future) tobacco area and production to the 
establishment of an auction floor. Estimations are likely to be biased if this problem is not 
appropriately addressed. The standard response in the literature on identification of impacts is 
to instrument the intervention.  
We will proceed likewise and exploit two intuitively appealing notions to construct 
instruments for intervention: in the first place we use expected tobacco turnover in EPA i, 
approximated with the sum pre-intervention production in the surrounding area as instrument. 
Surrounding area is defined as the potential source area for an auction floor if it was based in 
EPA i. We assume that the potential source area of an auction is within a radius of at most 
200 km21. Hence, the instrumental variable for each EPA is computed by aggregating pre-
intervention tobacco production that is produced in the neighborhood of this EPA, where 
neighborhood is defined to be those EPAs located within a radius of 150km. Note that 
expected production in the surrounding area includes the pre-intervention production of 
tobacco in EPA i itself. In formula this yields:  
݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐ݁݀ ݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜ ൌ ∑ ݍ௞଴௞          (4) 
where ݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐ݁݀ ݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜ is expected turnover of a tobacco potential auction if established 
in EPA i, ݍ௞଴ is (pre-intervention) production in EPA k and k pertains to all EPAs that are 
located within the source area of the possible auction. In the empirical work we have assumed 
that these EPAs are at most 50-150 kilometers away from EPA i.  
Secondly, we assume that it makes no sense for the auction company to establish a new 
auction floor that competes for tobacco with an existing auction floor22. Therefore the second 
                                                            
21 By varying the radius for sourcing tobacco we may calibrate the sum of 2008-2009 EPA production in 
surrounding area on the 2009 realized turnover for each auction (for this year we have sales volume by auction, 
see Appendix D). This exercise suggests a radius for sourcing tobacco of well above 200km for Blantyre, 
around 200km for Mzuzu, around 60km for Lilongwe,  around 45km for Chinkhoma. 
22 It should be noted that there is only one auction company active in Malawi (Auction Holding Limited (AHL)). 
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instrument is a binary variable that characterizes proximity to an existing auction floor, where 
proximity to an existing auction floor is – again – defined as those EPAs located in the source 
area of the existing auction. In the empirical work we have assumed – again – that this 
concerns EPAs within a radius of at  most 50-150 km from existing auctions. Thus, 
݀ሺ݁ݔ݅ݏݐ݅݊݃ ܽݑܿݐ݅݋݊ሻ௜ ൌ 1 if there is an existing auction floor within a radius of 50-150km 
of EPA i and zero elsewhere. In summary we run a probit estimation using the following 
specification:  
 ܫ௜ ൌ ݂ሺ݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐ݁݀ ݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜, ݀ሺ݁ݔ݅ݏݐ݅݊݃ ܽݑܿݐ݅݋݊ሻ௜ሻ       (5) 
We expect partial derivatives of the intervention variable with respect to expected turnover to 
be positive ሺ߲ ܫ௜ ߲݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐ݁݀ ݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜⁄ ൐ 0ሻ and negative with respect to proximity to 
existing auctions ሺ߲ ܫ௜ ߲൫݀ሺ݁ݔ݅ݏݐ݅݊݃ ܽݑܿݐ݅݋݊ݏሻ൯௜ൗ ൏ 0ሻ. It should be noted that the second 
instrument, proximity to existing auctions, may lead to a perfect fit. Therefore, we may as 
well run the probit estimation of the intervention variable only with the expected turnover 
instrument, on a restricted sample. In that case we estimate:  
 ܫ௜ ൌ ݂ሺ݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐ݁݀ ݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜ሻ          (6) 
At this stage both expected turnover of a potential auction and proximity to existing auctions 
are loosely defined in terms of distance: we determine the relevant radius for both variables 
empirically. 
Data for estimations 
Data, data sources and variable construction are documented in Appendix A. Here we comment 
on a few data related issues. The impact estimations are based on annual data of agricultural 
production and crop area on the level of Extension Planning Area’s (EPAs). Extension 
Planning Areas (EPAs) are subdivisions of districts and have an average area of 523 km2 
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(median: 489 km2 23), an average population of around 68,000 (median: 60,000) and an 
average of around 17,000 households (median: 16,000). Data on production and area by EPA 
are available for the crop years from 2003/04 to 2009/10. The EPA data cover the whole of 
Malawi, a total of 198 EPAs. A substantial number of EPA observations at the start of the 
sample period are, however, missing. This is clear from comparison of aggregate production 
volumes with aggregate auction volumes (see Appendix A, Figure A2). There are also a few 
EPAs that have negligible tobacco cultivation, most notably EPAs in the district Chikwawa and 
Nsanje. 
In order to calculate distances between locations we use standard Great Circle 
Distances on the basis of latitude and longitude coordinates: Great Circle Distance is the 
shortest path between two points on the surface of a sphere (for calculation see e.g. 
www.cpearson.com). Hence, calculated distance from EPAs to the different auction floors is a 
crow’s eye distances. This involves a variety of errors (it is assumed that the earth is a perfect 
sphere, which is not the case; identified locations within EPAs may not necessarily be 
representative of the tobacco area in the EPA and road distance differs from crow’s eye 
distance24). Nevertheless, distances calculated on the basis of latitude – longitude coordinates 
are considered to be reasonable approximations for most pairs of locations.  
Data on maize prices are only by district, while data on tobacco prices are annual 
national average auction data (and, hence, do not distinguish the different auctions). We have 
also used farm gate prices for tobacco, but these often generated poor results, much poorer than 
                                                            
23 A few districts have very large sized EPAs (Kasungu and Nkhotakotha, respectively above 1300km2 and 
1050km2 and one very small EPA (Likoma, 18km2). The bulk of the EPAs has a size between 230km2 and 
800km2. 
24 This applies most explicitly for a number of EPAs in the district of Mangochi: crows eye distance assumes 
that transport to Lilongwe, Chinkhoma and Mzuzu runs across lake Malawi.  In principle transport by ship is 
feasible, but transport costs differ drastically from transport costs by truck. Hence, whatever is the case crow’s 
eye distance is not a good approximation for transport costs for these EPAs. 
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auction prices: possibly this is an indication that behavior is more guided by auction prices 
rather than farm gate prices. Rainfall data are available for a selection of weather stations – 
around 30 – which are attributed to EPAs on the basis of distance.  
 
4. Impact of market access on tobacco yield, area and production 
Selected estimation results for equation (4a) to (4c) are reported in Table 2, 3 and 4, 
respectively for yield, production and area. The tables show results with the intervention 
variable as a binary variable (first three columns) and as a variable that is inversely 
proportional to the minimum distance to the new auction floor (last three columns). We 
report respectively specifications with dummies only (column 1 and 4), including dummies 
and additional covariates (column 2 and 5) and including dummies, additional covariates and 
the lagged dependent variable (column 3 and 6). Following Arellano and Bond (1991), 
specification in column 3 and 6 include the lagged dependent variable as an additional 
regressor in order to control for endogeneity. If we include the lagged dependent variable we 
lose one year observations, the base year. As a result we cannot distinguish impact dummies 
from EPA fixed effects: again, impacts are identified through the EPA fixed effect. Therefore 
we have omitted the impact dummy for 2004-05. This appears justified, since the impact in 
this year is small and insignificant in previous estimations of both yield, area and  production. 
In the specifications including the lagged dependent variable, the long run impact is 
calculated as β/(1-φ) where β is the coefficient of the intervention variable and φ is the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, and using ݕ௜,௧ ൌ ݕ௜,௧ି௞ (or ݍ௜,௧ ൌ ݍ௜,௧ି௞, or 
ܽ௜,௧ ൌ ܽ௜,௧ି௞) for any k.  
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Table 2 Estimated effects of market access on tobacco yield: basic specification  
Dependent variable:   
                natural logarithm of tobacco yield by Extension Planning Area (ln(qtobacco,i,t/ atobacco,i,t)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(2004-2005) 0.1155 0.1394     
 (1.4) (1.9)     
I(2005-2006) 0.1093 0.1187 -0.0250    
 (1.3) (1.6) (0.4)    
I(2006-2007) 0.2062 0.2280 0.0710    
 (2.5) (3.1) (1.1)    
I(2007-2008) 0.2554 0.2672 0.1135    
 (3.1) (3.6) (1.8)    
I(2008-2009) 0.2715 0.3120 0.0988    
 (3.3) (4.2) (1.6)    
I(2009-2010) 0.2369 0.2710 0.1128    
 (2.9) (3.7) (1.8)    
1/dna x I(2004-2005)    0.0068 0.0094  
    (1.4) (2.1)  
1/dna x I(2005-2006)    0.0062 0.0093 -0.0029 
    (1.2) (2.1) (0.8) 
1/dna x I(2006-2007)    0.0124 0.0149 0.0046 
    (2.5) (3.4) (1.3) 
1/dna x I(2007-2008)    0.0155 0.0174 0.0076 
    (3.1) (3.9) (2.1) 
1/dna x I(2008-2009)    0.0163 0.0200 0.0068 
    (3.3) (4.5) (1.9) 
1/dna x I(2009-2010)    0.0144 0.01765 0.0076 
    (2.9) (4.0) (2.1) 
ln(lagged tobacco yield)   0.1231    
   (3.7)    
ln(lagged tobacco price)  0.0805 0.2811  0.0873 -0.1802 
  (0.9) (1.2)  (1.0) (0.7) 
ln(lagged maize price)  0.2352 0.1306  0.2274 0.1292 
  (2.6) (1.1)  (2.6) (1.1) 
ln(rainfall)  0.1921 -0.0042  0.1854 0.0405 
  (3.4) (0.1)  (3.3) (0.7) 
ln(chemical fertilizer use)  -0.0117 0.0260  -0.0149 0.0167 
  (0.4) (0.7)  (0.5) (0.5) 
dEPA(i) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
dYEAR (t) x REG(k) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 1182 1150 942 1182 1148 940 
F (.) (213, 968) 7.79 
(210, 939) 
10.46 
(204, 737) 
11.62 
(213, 968) 
7.80 
(210, 937) 
10.57 
(203, 736) 
11.81 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 0.5506 0.6335 0.6972 0.5509 0.6367 0.7003 
RMSE 0.27472 0.23549 0.20411 0.27465 0.23381 0.19651 
Notes – The table reports estimates of tobacco yield. Estimations are based on annual data from 2003-04 to 2009-10 (seven 
years). Tobacco price and maize prices are nominal prices and are expected to have an opposite sign. All equations are 
estimated with OLS. Absolute t-statistics are given in parentheses (.) below the coefficient. Adjusted R2 = coefficient of 
determination, adjusted for degrees of freedom, and RMSE = Root Mean Squared Error. We do not report coefficients and t-
values of the constant term and a complete set of EPA dummies and year by region dummies (dEPA(i), dYEAR(t) x 
REG(k)). Estimations follow the specification of equation (4a), with restrictions on the coefficients. 
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Table 3      Estimated effects of market access on tobacco production: basic specification  
Dependent variable:  natural logarithm of tobacco production relative to base period tobacco production, by 
Extension Planning Area (ln(qtobacco,i,t / qtobacco,i,base))
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(2004-2005) 0.2286 0.2829     
 (1.5) (1.8)     
I(2005-2006) 0.2413 0.4080 0.0339    
 (1.5) (2.6) (0.3)    
I(2006-2007) 0.2813 0.3461 0.1853    
 (1.8) (2.2) (1.5)    
I(2007-2008) 0.4746 0.5192 0.2960    
 (3.0) (3.4) (2.4)    
I(2008-2009) 0.3110 0.3764 0.0923    
 (2.0) (2.4) (0.8)    
I(2009-2010) 0.2593 0.2185 -0.0323    
 (1.6) (1.4) (0.3)    
1/dna x I(2004-2005)    0.0135 0.0189  
    (1.4) (2.1)  
1/dna x I(2005-2006)    0.0137 0.0202 0.0022 
    (1.4) (2.2) (0.3) 
1/dna x I(2006-2007)    0.0202 0.0200 0.0034 
    (2.1) (2.2) (0.5) 
1/dna x I(2007-2008)    0.0282 0.0337 0.0157 
    (2.9) (3.6) (2.1) 
1/dna x I(2008-2009)    0.0164 0.0216 0.0006 
    (1.7) (2.3) (0.1) 
1/dna x I(2009-2010)    0.0149 0.0147 -0.0072 
    (1.5) (1.6) (1.0) 
ln(lagged tobacco production)   0.4012   0.4294 
   (13.3)   (14.2) 
ln(lagged tobacco price)  -0.1018 2.5735  -0.2384 1.1593 
  (0.5) (7.5)  (1.3) (3.5) 
ln(lagged maize price)  0.5220 -0.0087  0.4917 0.0053 
  (2.8) (0.0)  (2.7) (1.0) 
ln(rainfall)  0.3070 0.3221  0.3056 0.4042 
  (2.5) (2.7)  (2.5) (3.3) 
ln(chemical fertilizer use)  -0.0850 -0.0065  -0.0800 -0.0578 
  (1.4) (0.1)  (1.3) (0.8) 
dEPA(i) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
dYEAR (t) x REG(k) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 1116 1101 896 1117 1104 912 
F (.) (190, 925) 7.15 
(191, 909) 
7.56 
(187, 708) 
12.68 
(190, 926) 
6.89 
(191, 912) 
7.65 
(187, 724) 
12.21 
Prob > chi2 0.00000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 0.5117 0.5352 0.7093 0.5006 0.5353 0.6971 
RMSE 0.50676 0.48360 0.38134 0.52359 0.48384 0.39754 
Notes – The table reports estimates of tobacco production. Estimations are based on annual data from 2003-04 to 2009-10 
(seven years). Tobacco price and maize prices are nominal prices and are expected to have an opposite sign. All equations 
are estimated with OLS. Absolute t-statistics are given in parentheses (.) below the coefficient. Adjusted R2 = coefficient of 
determination, adjusted for degrees of freedom, and RMSE = Root Mean Squared Error. We do not report coefficients and t-
values of the constant term and a complete set of EPA dummies and year by region dummies (dEPA(i), dYEAR(t) x 
REG(k)). Estimations follow the specification of equation (4b), with restrictions on the coefficients. 
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Table 4 Estimated effects of market access on tobacco area: basic specification  
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of tobacco area relative to base period tobacco area, by Extension 
Planning Area (ln(atobacco,i,t / atobacco,i,base))
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(2004-2005) 0.0515 0.1473     
 (0.4) (1.1)     
I(2005-2006) 0.1101 0.1821 0.0550    
 (0.9) (1.4) (0.5)    
I(2006-2007) 0.0630 0.0792 -0.0169    
 (0.5) (0.6) (0.2)    
I(2007-2008) 0.0979 0.2300 0.2008    
 (0.8) (1.8) (1.9)    
I(2008-2009) 0.0125 0.0199 -0.0871    
 (0.1) (0.2) (0.8)    
I(2009-2010) -0.0557 -0.1196 -0.1524    
 (0.4) (0.9) (1.4)    
1/dna x I(2004-2005)    0.0037 0.0071  
    (0.5) (0.9)  
1/dna x I(2005-2006)    0.0054 0.0091 0.0011 
    (0.7) (1.1) (0.2) 
1/dna x I(2006-2007)    -0.0001 0.0028 -0.0024 
    (0.0) (0.4) (0.4) 
1/dna x I(2007-2008)    0.0087 0.0111 0.0099 
    (1.1) (1.4) (1.5) 
1/dna x I(2008-2009)    -0.0039 -0.0011 -0.0069 
    (0.5) (0.2) (1.1) 
1/dna x I(2009-2010)    -0.0134 -0.1411 -0.0111 
    (1.7) (0.9) (1.7) 
ln(lagged tobacco area)   0.4940   0.5025 
   (15.8)   (16.1) 
ln(lagged tobacco price)  -0.1400 0.4340  -0.1411 1.0366 
  (0.9) (1.1)  (0.9) (3.2) 
ln(lagged maize price)  0.3480 -0.0972  0.3967 -0.1233 
  (2.3) (0.5)  (2.5) (0.7) 
dEPA(i) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
dYEAR (t) x REG (k) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 1110 1122 921 1123 1123 927 
F (.) (189, 920) 5.68 
(191, 930) 
5.85 
(187, 733) 
10.15 
(189, 933) 
5.75 
(191, 931) 
5.74 
(186, 740) 
11.01 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 0.5387 0.4523 0.6502 0.5379 0.4465 0.6679 
RMSE 0.40312 0.41780 0.34152 0.42093 0.42402 0.34503 
Notes – The table reports estimates of tobacco area. Estimations are based on annual data from 2003-04 to 2009-10 (seven 
years). Tobacco price and maize prices are nominal prices and are expected to have an opposite sign. All equations are 
estimated with OLS. Absolute t-statistics are given in parentheses (.) below the coefficient. Adjusted R2 = coefficient of 
determination, adjusted for degrees of freedom, and RMSE = Root Mean Squared Error. We do not report coefficients and t-
values of the constant term and a complete set of EPA dummies and year by region dummies (dEPA(i), dYEAR(t) x 
REG(k)). Estimations follow the specification of equation (4c), with restrictions on the coefficients. 
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In the estimations we have checked for outliers in order to prevent that size and 
(in)significance of coefficients are to a large extent due to a few observations25. The dummies 
used in the estimations concern a complete set of EPA dummies combined with a complete 
set of region-by-year dummies. The intervention dummies are identified by the inclusion of 
EPA dummies / EPA fixed effects. 
We first consider the estimations of the impact of market access on yield (Table 2). The 
intervention dummies are statistically significant for all impacts except the one of the first years 
of possible impact, 2004-2005 and 2005-2006. The size of the impact is large, grows over the 
years but drops in the final year. Including additional covariates increases the size of the impact 
coefficients moderately, but essentially does not change the pattern of impact. Additional 
covariates – tobacco prices, maize prices, rainfall and  chemical fertilizer use (NPK) – perform 
mixed: coefficients not always have the expected sign and are statistically significant with the 
expected sign in only a few instances. Also the contribution to explaining variation is limited. 
Including the lagged dependent variable to the additional covariates deteriorates the impact 
coefficients: the impact coefficients are still positive and significant, but become slightly lower 
and particularly small in the last year. 
The estimation results of Table 2 support a statistically significant impact of the new 
auction floor on yield. We are keen to find out if this increase in yield is due to production 
increases, area increases or both and this can be investigated on the basis of impact 
estimations using production and area as outcome variable, as is implemented in Table 3 and 
Table 4. The impact estimations using production as outcome variable, reported in Table 3, 
are similar to the yield equations. The intervention dummies are also statistically significant 
for all impacts except the ones of the first years of possible impact, 2004-2005 and 2005-2006. 
                                                            
25 This notion – that size and (in)significance of coefficients are to a large extent due to one or a few 
observations – constitutes our definition of an outlier. 
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The size of the impact is large, grows over the years, reaches a peak in 2007-2008, and drops in 
the final years. Including additional covariates, again, increases the size of the impact 
coefficients somewhat, but essentially does not change the pattern of impact. Again, the 
performance of the additional covariates is mixed. However, rainfall is consistently statistically 
significant with the expected positive sign. Including the lagged dependent variable to the 
additional covariates deteriorates the impact coefficients even more than in the case of the yield 
equation: all impact coefficients become statistically insignificant except the one for 2007-
2008.  
Next, we turn to the estimations that measure the impact of market access on area 
(Table 4). The output shows consistently insignificant impact coefficients for all years, in all 
specifications. Including additional covariates and the lagged dependent variable also does not 
change the pattern of impact: hardly any significant impact, with a possibly exception for the 
impact in 2007-2008 that becomes weakly significant. The performance of additional 
covariates – in case of the area equation only tobacco prices and maize prices – is again mixed. 
We may conclude on the basis of the estimations in Table 2, 3 ad 4 that market access has a 
statistically significant positive impact on yield that stems primarily from increases in 
production.  
In the previous section we stated that the intervention variable – the introduction of a 
new auction floor – is endogenous and needs to be modelled. We proceed with presenting the 
estimation results for instrumenting the intervention variable and re-running the impact 
estimations for yield, production and area using instrumental variables. 
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Table 5   Estimation of selection of EPAs that benefit from the Chinkhoma auction floor 
Dependent variable:  intervention locations (binary variable: 1 if Chinkhoma auction floor is (approximately) 
the closest auction floor (see also Identification of intervention locations) and zero elsewhere) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(expected tobacco turnover) 1.6610 4.9701 2.5014 6.3769 1.5400 14.2009 
 (6.6) (5.3) (4.8) (3.1) (3.9) (3.4) 
d(proximity to Lilongwe auction floor)  -4.8356  -5.6167  -12.924 
  (5.3)  (3.0)  (3.3) 
d(proximity to Mzuzu auction floor)  -1.7040  -2.3751  -3.8461 
  (3.7)  (2.7)  (2.2) 
Excluding EPAs near to auction floor in   Bla(200) Bla(200) Bla(200) Bla(200) 
     Mzu(50) Mzu(50) 
     Lil(30) Lil(30) 
Number of observations 199 199 113 113 94 94 
LR chi2 (.) (1) 78.84 
(3) 
143.51 
(1) 
46.55 
(3) 
80.31 
(1) 
31.07 
(3) 
93.87 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.3549 0.6460 0.3010 0.5193 0.2388 0.7212 
Log pseudo likelihood -71.65 -39.32 -54.05 -37.17 -49.53 -18.14 
Notes – The table reports estimates of selection of EPAs that benefit from the Chinkhoma auction floor. Estimations are 
based on annual data of 2005-2006, or later (for the dependent variable, or the intervention variable) and data from 2003-04 
to 2005-06 (for the pre-intervention explanatory variables). All equations are estimated with PROBIT. Absolute z-statistics 
are given in parentheses (.) below the coefficient, and these are based on robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich 
estimator). Pseudo R2 = pseudo coefficient of determination. We do not report coefficients and t-values of the constant term. 
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Table 6         Estimated effects of market access on tobacco yield: instrumental variables  
Dependent variable:   
                natural logarithm of tobacco yield by Extension Planning Area (ln(qtobacco,i,t / atobacco,i,t)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(2004-2005) 0.0974 0.1108     
 (1.0) (1.1)     
I(2005-2006) 0.0790 0.0940 -0.0325    
 (0.8) (0.9) (0.4)    
I(2006-2007) 0.2301 0.2333 0.1093    
 (2.4) (2.4) (1.5)    
I(2007-2008) 0.2790 0.2890 0.1503    
 (2.9) (2.9) (2.0)    
I(2008-2009) 0.3146 0.3604 0.1454    
 (3.3) (3.6) (2.0)    
I(2009-2010) 0.2723 0.3111 0.1666    
 (2.9) (3.2) (2.3)    
1/dna x I(2004-2005)    0.0002 0.0028  
    (0.0) (0.5)  
1/dna x I(2005-2006)    0.0046 0.0070 0.0022 
    (1.0) (1.5) (0.6) 
1/dna x I(2006-2007)    0.0105 0.0118 0.0093 
    (2.2) (2.4) (2.7) 
1/dna x I(2007-2008)    0.0094 0.0108 0.0082 
    (2.0) (2.3) (2.3) 
1/dna x I(2008-2009)    0.0116 0.0147 0.0102 
    (2.5) (3.0) (2.9) 
1/dna x I(2009-2010)    0.0116 0.0139 0.0110 
    (2.5) (2.9) (3.2) 
ln(lagged tobacco yield)   0.1189   0.0897 
   (3.6)   (2.7) 
ln(lagged tobacco price)  0.8974 0.2789  0.3225 -0.6627 
  (2.8) (1.2)  (3.3) (2.3) 
ln(lagged maize price)  0.2235 0.1411  0.1868 0.1063 
  (2.2) (1.2)  (1.8) (0.9) 
ln(rainfall)  0.2003 0.0001  0.1837 0.0332 
  (3.1) (0.0)  (2.8) (0.6) 
ln(chemical fertilizer use)  -0.0059 0.0216  0.0030 0.0171 
  (0.2) (0.6)  (0.1) (0.5) 
dEPA(i) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
dYEAR (t) x REG(k) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 1182 1154 942 1182 1152 940 
F (.) (213, 968) 7.82 
(209, 944) 
7.68 
(204, 737) 
11.70 
(213, 968) 
7.76 
(209, 942) 
7.64 
(203, 736) 
11.84 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 0.5515 0.5476 0.6988 0.5492 0.5466 0.7008 
RMSE 0.27446 0.27504 0.20358 0.27515 0.2747 0.19635 
Notes – The table reports estimates of tobacco yield. Estimations are based on annual data from 2003-04 to 2009-10 (seven 
years). Tobacco price and maize prices are nominal prices and are expected to have an opposite sign. All equations are 
estimated with IV of the intervention variable. Absolute t-statistics are given in parentheses (.) below the coefficient. 
Adjusted R2 = coefficient of determination, adjusted for degrees of freedom, and RMSE = Root Mean Squared Error. We do 
not report coefficients and t-values of the constant term and a complete set of EPA dummies and year by region dummies 
(dEPA(i), dYEAR(t) x REG(k)). Estimations follow the specification of equation (4a), with restrictions on the coefficients. 
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Table 7 Estimated effects of market access on tobacco production:  
instrumental variables  
Dependent variable:  natural logarithm of tobacco production relative to base period tobacco production, by 
Extension Planning Area (ln(qtobacco,i,t / qtobacco,i,base)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(2005-2006) 0.3236 0.2883     
 (1.7) (1.5)     
I(2004-2005) 0.2810 0.3127 0.0198    
 (1.5) (1.7) (0.1)    
I(2006-2007) 0.3547 0.3184 0.2031    
 (1.9) (1.7) (1.3)    
I(2007-2008) 0.6471 0.5834 0.4059    
 (3.5) (3.1) (2.8)    
I(2008-2009) 0.4535 0.4249 0.1392    
 (2.4) (2.2) (0.9)    
I(2009-2010) 0.4193 0.2200 -0.0042    
 (2.2) (1.1) (0.0)    
1/dna x I(2004-2005)    0.0228 0.0276  
    (2.3) (2.8)  
1/dna x I(2005-2006)    0.0210 0.0270 -0.0077 
    (2.2) (2.9) (0.9) 
1/dna x I(2006-2007)    0.0193 0.0228 -0.0066 
    (2.0) (2.4) (0.8) 
1/dna x I(2007-2008)    0.0269 0.0185 0.0055 
    (2.7) (2.0) (0.6) 
1/dna x I(2008-2009)    0.0196 0.0187 -0.0065 
    (2.0) (2.0) (0.8) 
1/dna x I(2009-2010)    0.0199 0.0193 -0.0079 
    (2.0) (1.9) (1.0) 
ln(lagged tobacco production)   0.4022   0.4160 
   (13.3)   (12.5) 
ln(lagged tobacco price)  1.0117 2.6206  0.6421 1.1031 
  (3.2) (7.6)  (3.6) (3.1) 
ln(lagged maize price)  0.5199 -0.0263  0.5966 0.1853 
  (2.7) (0.1)  (3.1) (0.7) 
ln(rainfall)  0.2923 0.3311  0.2728 0.4194 
  (2.3) (2.8)  (2.1) (3.1) 
ln(chemical fertilizer use)  -0.0692 -0.0082  -0.0157 -0.1081 
  (1.1) (0.1)  (0.3) (1.4) 
dEPA(i) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
dYEAR (t) x REG(k) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 1116 1106 896 1117 1105 912 
F (.) (190, 925) 7.20 
(190, 915) 
6.84 
(187, 708) 
12.73 
(190, 926) 
6.89 
(190, 914) 
6.75 
(187, 724) 
9.55 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 0.5137 0.5011 0.7102 0.5005 0.4973 0.6371 
RMSE 0.50571 0.50960 0.38073 0.50799 0.50567 0.43475 
Notes – The table reports estimates of tobacco production. Estimations are based on annual data from 2003-04 to 2009-10 
(seven years). Tobacco price and maize prices are nominal prices and are expected to have an opposite sign. All equations 
are estimated with IV of the intervention variable. Absolute t-statistics are given in parentheses (.) below the coefficient. 
Adjusted R2 = coefficient of determination, adjusted for degrees of freedom, and RMSE = Root Mean Squared Error. We do 
not report coefficients and t-values of the constant term and a complete set of EPA dummies and year by region dummies 
(dEPA(i), dYEAR(t) x REG(k)). Estimations follow the specification of equation (4b), with restrictions on the coefficients. 
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Table 8 Estimated effects of market access on tobacco area:  
instrumental variables  
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of tobacco area relative to base period tobacco area, by Extension 
Planning Area (ln(atobacco,i,t / atobacco,i,base)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(2004-2005) 0.1046 0.2112     
 (0.7) (1.4)     
I(2005-2006) 0.1208 0.1713 0.0455    
 (0.8) (1.1) (0.4)    
I(2006-2007) 0.0419 0.0978 -0.0491    
 (0.3) (0.6) (0.4)    
I(2007-2008) 0.1279 0.2694 0.2543    
 (0.9) (1.8) (2.0)    
I(2008-2009) 0.0463 0.0387 -0.1212    
 (0.3) (0.3) (1.0)    
I(2009-2010) -0.0144 -0.1578 -0.1912    
 (0.1) (1.0) (1.5)    
1/dna x I(2004-2005)    0.0068 0.0126  
    (0.9) (1.6)  
1/dna x I(2005-2006)    0.0053 0.0062 -0.0056 
    (0.7) (0.8) (0.9) 
1/dna x I(2006-2007)    -0.0037 -0.0026 -0.0083 
    (0.5) (0.3) (1.3) 
1/dna x I(2007-2008)    -0.0055 -0.0005 -0.0054 
    (0.8) (0.1) (0.9) 
1/dna x I(2008-2009)    -0.0114 -0.0054 -0.0109 
    (1.6) (0.7) (1.8) 
1/dna x I(2009-2010)    -0.0211 -0.0110 -0.0181 
    (3.0) (1.5) (2.9) 
ln(lagged tobacco area)   0.4965   0.4926 
   (15.9)   (15.7) 
ln(lagged tobacco price)  -0.0788 0.4766  0.3264 0.2506 
  (0.3) (1.1)  (2.4) (0.9) 
ln(lagged maize price)  0.3429 -0.1233  0.3648 -0.0255 
  (2.3) (0.6)  (2.5) (0.1) 
dEPA(i) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
dYEAR (t) x REG (k) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 1110 1117 921 1123 1119 927 
F (.) (189, 920) 5.68 
(189, 927) 
5.50
(187, 733) 
10.19
(189, 933) 
5.90
(190, 928) 
5.76 
(186, 740) 
10.97
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 0.4435 0.4325 0.6513 0.4523 0.4472 0.6669 
RMSE 0.40328 0.41702 0.34098 0.41971 0.41364 0.34552 
Notes – The table reports estimates of tobacco area. Estimations are based on annual data from 2003-04 to 2009-10 (seven 
years). Tobacco price and maize prices are nominal prices and are expected to have an opposite sign. All equations are 
estimated with IV of the intervention variable. Absolute t-statistics are given in parentheses (.) below the coefficient. 
Adjusted R2 = coefficient of determination, adjusted for degrees of freedom, and RMSE = Root Mean Squared Error. We do 
not report coefficients and t-values of the constant term and a complete set of EPA dummies and year by region dummies 
(dEPA(i), dYEAR(t) x REG(k)). Estimations follow the specification of equation (4c), with restrictions on the coefficients. 
 
 
Table 5 reports equations that explain the intervention variable – the question if farmers in a 
specific EPA benefit from the newly established auction floor or not – using expected 
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revenue and proximity to an existing auction floor as instruments. The estimated coefficienets 
are well behaved: expected turnover and proximity to existing auctions are both significant 
and have the expected sign. It should be noted that variations in source area, both of  possible 
new auction floors as well of existing auction floors, allow quite some flexibility in these 
estimations. We have used the estimate reported in column 6 as the basis of the instrumental 
variable estimations, reported in Table 6, 7 and 8. 
 The instrumental variable estimations, reported in Table 6, 7 and 8, further confirm 
the results that are also generated with the basic estimations: the estimations support a 
positive impact of the introduction of a new auction floor on yield and production, and no 
impact on crop area. The yield equations estimated with instrumental variables (Table 6) 
indicate a significant impact starting in 2006-2007. The production equations estimated with 
instrumental variables (Table 7) also indicate a significant impact starting in 2006-2007. The 
size of the production impact appears to be slightly larger. 
The estimation results from the tables are summarized in Figure 3. In this figure we 
have plotted the impact on area and production relative to the average “pre-intervention” levels 
of area and production in the intervention EPAs. In the specification using the inverse of the 
minimum distance we have evaluated the impact coefficient against the average annual inverse 
of the minimum distance. We have also included the 95% confidence intervals of the estimated 
impact. 
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Figure 3 Effects of market access on tobacco yield (upper panel) and on production 
(lower panel)a, in % of base year production and area) 
 
 
 
a The dotted lines indicate 95% confidence intervals 
Notes – Figures are calculated on the basis of estimation results. 
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The figures are self explanatory. Apart from summarizing the estimations presented in the 
tables, the figures summarize the major message of this research. The EPA data used for this 
work support a large impact of market access on tobacco yield and tobacco production. The 
impact on yield and production is marginal in the first years, but increases after some years to 
reach a maximum of 30 to 40% above base year levels, after around four years. The size of the 
impact is large but not out of proportion in view of the sizable reduction in costs realized by 
market access. In the last year of our sample the impact drops: more research and more data are 
needed to explain this. We could not find a significant impact on area. Inclusion of additional 
covariates (rainfall, fertilizer use, tobacco prices, maize prices), lagged dependent variables 
and instrumenting of the intervention variable all maintain the basic message of this exercise. 
Alternative explanations 
Trend developments 
The measured impact could be the result of differences between the intervention and non 
intervention EPAs that existed before the intervention took place. Hence, we need to verify if 
the intervention and non-intervention EPAs were on a similar time path during the pre-
intervention period. Unfortunately we have few observations in the pre-intervention period: 
strictly, we have only one year of pre-intervention data (2003-04) since the auction floor started 
operation in 2004. However, from the estimations it is evident that the measured impact is 
delayed a few years, and therefore we may move up in the intervention period a few years for 
this purpose.  
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Table 9 Comparison of variables of intervention and non–intervention locations  
    in the pre-intervention period 
  Unconditional mean   
 period intervention non-intervention difference F test  
area (level) 2003/04-2005/06  1762.3 
(25.4) 
405.5 
(9.8) 
1356.8 280.6  
(0.000) 
area (trend) 2003/04-2005/06 12.3 
(0.1) 
15.8 
(0.3) 
-3.5 0.00 
(0.972) 
area (growth) 2004/05-2006/07 0.029 
(0.6) 
0.024 
(0.8) 
0.005 0.01 
(0.935) 
production (level) 2003/04-2005/06 1091.6 
(18.1) 
372.5 
(10.4) 
719.1 105.0 
(0.000) 
production (trend) 2003/04-2005/06 83.3 
(1.2) 
63.8 
(1.6) 
19.5 0.06 
(0.811) 
production (growth) 2004/05-2005/06 0.275 
(3.7) 
0.285 
(5.7) 
-0.010 0.01 
(0.910) 
Rainfall 2003/04-2005/06 928.5 
(41.4) 
954.8 
(67.0) 
-26.3 0.28 
(0.595) 
fertilizer use 2003/04-2005/06 394.1 
(17.1) 
398.5 
(27.3) 
-4.4 0.03 
(0.873) 
Notes – The table report means and differences of the group of intervention EPAs and the group of non-intervention 
EPAs, both during the pre-intervention period. The table additionally reports the F test and its P-value on the 
significance of the difference. Trend is estimated, combined with a constant term. 
 
Table 9 shows the unconditional means of intervention and non intervention variables, both 
outcome and additional covariates, its difference and mean difference tests, all during the pre-
intervention period. The mean test confirm a significant difference in levels, which is not a 
surprise: it would have been coincidence if the level of tobacco area and production in 
intervention and non-intervention EPAs is similar. Since, we are more concerned with 
developments over time and hence we do not consider this to be relevant. Tests on trend 
developments and  annual rates of change of the outcome variables (area and production) and 
on other co-variates, of both the intervention EPAs and the non-intervention EPAs are 
consistently shown to be similar in the pre-intervention period. Hence, we may conclude that 
intervention and non-intervention EPAs are on a similar time path before the intervention. 
Ceilings to expansion 
Another issue concerns the presence of ceilings to expand: if all land suitable for tobacco 
cultivation is exhausted, there are no possibilities for further growth of tobacco production. 
EPAs that meet these conditions cannot be used as controls. Potential availability of crop area 
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can be investigated: EPA data are available for all major crops and for this exercise we 
distinguish crop area for tobacco, maize and other crops, where “other crops” is an aggregate 
of rice, groundnuts, pulses, cassava, sweet potatoes, cotton, sorghum and millet. The data 
underscore the overwhelming importance of maize, with an average share of around 50% of 
total crop area (see also Zant, 2012, for further details on the dominant role of maize). 
Expansion of tobacco crop area is realized either through expansion of total crop area or 
through substitution with other crops. We calculate the potential for expansion of total crop 
area, by computing the gap between the maximum total crop area over the years and actual 
total crop area by EPA (݌ܽ௜௧,௘௫௣௔௡௦௜௢௡ ൌ ܯܣܺ௧ሺܣܴܧܣ௜௧ሻ െ ܣܴܧܣ௜௧ where ݌ܽ௜௧,௘௫௣௔௡௦௜௢௡ is 
potential crop area by expansion and ܣܴܧܣ௜௧ is crop area of all crops, both in EPA i and in 
period t). The intuition is simple: we do not observe the potential crop area available for 
expansion, but assume that the maximum of total crop area realized over a period of several 
years, minus actual crop area, is a good approximation. Next, we calculate substitution for 
other crops by computing the difference between “other crop” area by EPA and the minimum 
area allocated to other crops in this EPA (݌ܽ௜௧,௦௨௕௦௧௜௧௨௧௜௢௡ ൌ ܽݎ݁ܽ௢௧௛௘௥ ௖௥௢௣௦,௜௧ െ
ܯܫ ௧ܰሺܽݎ݁ܽ௢௧௛௘௥ ௖௥௢௣௦,௜௧ሻ where ݌ܽ௜௧,௦௨௕௦௧௜௧௜௢௡ is potential crop area by substitution and 
ܽݎ݁ܽ௢௧௛௘௥௖௥௢௣௦,௜௧ is crop area allocated to other crops, both in EPA i and in period t). 
Implicitly, we assume that all potential substitution takes place in the “other crops” and only 
to the extent that crop area allocated to other crops exceeds a minimum level. The sum of 
potential expansion and potential substitution area (݌ܽ௜௧ ൌ ݌ܽ௜௧,௘௫௣௔௡௦௜௢௡ ൅ ݌ܽ௜௧,௦௨௕௦௧௜௧௨௧௜௢௡) 
expressed in terms of tobacco area (݌ܽ௜௧/ܽݎ݁ܽ௧௢௕௔௖௖௢,௜௧), should be high for available area in 
order not to be a restriction for growth of tobacco area. On the basis of the numerical exercise 
we find very few of the control EPAs to have expansion opportunities for tobacco cultivation 
less than 100% of existing tobacco area in any year. Only a few EPAs in the northern districts 
43 
 
Rumphi and Mzimba26 have below 100% potential area expansion opportunities. Even these 
EPAs have a minimum opportunity for expanding tobacco area of 20% per year.  Hence, the 
average expansion opportunities of non-intervention EPAs, expressed in terms of existing 
tobacco area, are high and we should conclude that there are no effective restrictions in this 
respect27. 
Impact on other crops 
The statistically significant impact on tobacco yield and tobacco production in the EPAs that 
are benefitting from the newly established auction may be a coincidental outcome that applies 
to all crops in these EPAs. For this reason we have repeated the impact estimations using 
yield, production and area of alternative crop, notably groundnuts. Groundnut is a cash crop, 
groundnut cultivation has a country wide distribution similar to tobacco and groundnuts is 
also an important source of income (although less than tobacco). The results of these 
estimations are reported in Appendix D. The estimation results do not support a systematic 
and significant impact on yield, production or area of groundnuts, thereby providing further 
support for the impact of market access on smallholder tobacco farmers. 
 
5. Summary and conclusion 
We have investigated the impact of improved market access on yield and the underlying 
smallholder’s decisions on production and area. For this purpose we have exploited the quasi 
experimental design of the introduction of an additional tobacco auction floor in Malawi. 
Tobacco is the most important cash crop in Malawi, grown in the entire country and 
                                                            
26 Notably Bolero, Katowo, Mhuju and Mphompha in Rumphi, and Bwenga and Malidadi in Mzimba. 
27 We cannot analyze if availability of labor is a restriction to growth of tobacco production in the control EPAs. 
However, it is hard to believe that labor is used for low return activities rather than profitable and commercially 
attractive crops. Hence, we assume there is no restriction on labor, either because of a large number of unpaid 
workers in rural areas, but also because of easy conversion from low return activities to high return activities. 
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exclusively sold on auctions. There are four tobacco auction floors (Limbe (Blantyre), 
Kanengo (Lilongwe), Mzuzu and Chinkhoma), of which the one in Chinkhoma has started 
operations in 2004. Estimations are based on annual data by Extension Planning Area 
(EPAs), 198 in total, covering the whole of Malawi, for a period of seven years, from 2003 to 
2009. The data allow to track the dynamics of the impact of market access over the years. 
The estimation results support a statistically significant positive impact of the introduction of 
the new auction floor on yield, increasing to from at least after one year 10% to 21% after 
four years. The evidence further suggest that this increase is entirely due to production 
increases rather than area increases. The impact on production increases gradually over the 
year to reach a maximum of around % above base year production. Production and area 
impacts are statistically significant. Additionally, the results are shown to be robust after 
inclusion of rainfall, fertilizer use, tobacco prices, maize prices, the lagged dependent 
variable, and overall trend and a complete set of region by year dummies. 
Since the data used for estimations are not household data, we cannot identify 
subsistence households, and, hence, we cannot answer the question – asked in the title of this 
paper – if access to market is going to help smallholders to move out of subsistence farming. 
However, the evidence does support a significant and sizable impact on tobacco production 
and area. With 81% of households in rural areas being classified as subsistence farmers 
(Integrated Household Survey-2, 2004-05) it is unlikely that the increase in yield and has not 
also affected subsistence farmers28. Distinct from this issue the results in this paper support a 
large impact of transaction costs and market access on agricultural area and production 
decisions in general.  
 
                                                            
28 Technically  it is possible that the entire increase in yield and production is due to the 19% non-subsistence 
farm households. Only household or farm level data can offer a conclusive answer. 
45 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Eric Bartelsman, Hans Binswanger, Chris Elbers, Christopher Gilbert, 
Menno Pradhan, Asger Moll Wingender, participants of the Nordic Conference in 
Development Economics in Götenborg, Sweden, June 18 and 19, 2012 and colleagues of VU-
University Amsterdam for comments and suggestions on previous versions of this paper. 
Errors and mistakes in the current paper are the responsibility of the author. 
  
46 
 
References 
Arellano, M and S. Bond, 1991, ‘Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo  
Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations’, Review of Economic 
Studies, 58, 2, 277-297. 
Aker, J.C., 2010, ‘Information for Markets Near and Far: Mobile Phones and Agricultural  
 Markets in Niger’, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2 (July), 46-59. 
Cadot, O., L. Dutoit and M. Olarreaga, 2006, ‘How Costly Is It for Poor Farmers to Lift 
Themselves Out of Subsistence?’, The World Bank. 
Duflo, E. and R. Pande, 2007, ‘Dams’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122, 2, 601-646. 
Duflo, E., R. Glennerster amd M. Kremer, 2007, ‘Using Randomization in Development  
Economics: a Tooolkit’, Center for Economic Policy Reserch (CEPR), Discussion 
Paper Series no 6059. 
Fafchamps, M., 1999, Rural poverty, Risk and Development, Rome, Food and Agriculture  
Organization. 
Fafchamps, M., E. Gabre-Madhin and B. Minten, 2005, ‘Increasing Returns and Market  
 Efficiency in Agricultural Trade’, Journal of Development Economics, 78, 406-442. 
Fafchamps, M., and R. Vargas Hill, 2005, ‘Selling at the Farmgate or Travelling to the  
 Market, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 87, 3, August, 717-734. 
Fafchamps, M. and B. Minten, 2012, ‘Impact of SMS-Based Agricultural Information on  
 Indian Farmers’, World Bank Economic Review, 27 (February), 1-32. 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2003, ‘Issues in the Global  
 Tobacco Economy: Selected case studies’, Rome. 
Goetz, S.J., 1992, ‘A Selectivity Model of Household Food Marketing Behavior in Sub- 
 Saharan Africa’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 74, 444-452. 
Goyal, A., 2010, ‘Information, Direct Access to Farmers and Rural Market Performance in  
47 
 
 Central India’, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2 (July), 22-45. 
Harrigan, J., 2008, ‘Food Insecurity, Poverty and the Malawian Starter Pack: Fresh Start or  
 False Start?’, Food Policy, 33, 237-249. 
Harrigan, J., 2003, ‘U-Turns and Full Circles: Two Decades of Agricultural Reform in  
 Malawi 1981-2000’, World Development, 31, 5, 847-863. 
Jaffee, S., 2003, ‘Malawi’s Tobacco Sector: Standing on One Strong Leg is Better Than on  
 None’, World Bank, Africa Region Working Paper Series, nr. 55. 
De Janvry, A., M.Fafchamps and E. Sadoulet, 1991, ‘Peasant Household Behaviour with  
Missing Markets: Some Paradoxes Explained’, The Economic Journal, 101,  
November, 1400-1417. 
De Janvry, A. and E. Sadoulet, 2010, ‘Agriculture for Development in Africa: Business-as 
 Usual or New Departures’, Journal of African Economies, 19, AERC, Sup. 2, ii7-ii39. 
Jayne, T.S, 1994, ‘Do High Food Marketing Costs Constrain Cash Crop Production?  
Evidence from Zimbabwe’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 42, 2 
January, 387-402. 
Jensen, R., 2007, ‘The Digital Provide: Information (Technology), Market Performance, and  
Welfare in the South Indian Fisheries Sector’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
72,3,879. 
Key, N., E. Sadoulet and A. de Janvry, 2000, ‘Transactions Costs and Agricultural Household  
 Supply Response’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 82, May, 245-259. 
Kydd, J. and R. Christiansen, 1982, ‘Structural Change in Malawi since Independence:  
Consequences of a Development Strategy Based on Large-Scale Agriculture’, World 
Development, Vol. 10, No. 5, pp. 355-75. 
Lea, N. and L. Hammer, 2009, ‘Constraints to Growth in Malawi’, The World Bank, Policy  
 Research Working Paper 5097. 
48 
 
Negri, M and G.G. Porto, 2008, ‘Burley Tobacco Clubs in Malawi: Nonmarket Institutions  
 for Exports’, The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 4561. 
Minten, B. and S. Kyle, 1999, ‘The effect of Distance and Road Quality on Food Collection, 
Marketing Margins, and Traders’ Wages: Evidence from the Former Zaire’, Journal 
of Development Economics, 60, 467-495. 
Muto, M. and T. Yamano, 2009, ‘The Impact of Mobile Phone Coverage Expansion on  
Market Participation: Panel Data Evidence from Uganda’, World Development, 37, 
12, 1887-1896. 
Omamo, S.W., 1998, ‘Transport Costs and Smallholder Cropping Choices: An Application to  
 Siaya District, Kenya’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 80, 116-123. 
Orr, A., 2000, ‘Green Gold’?: Burley Tobacco, Smallholder Agriculture, and Poverty  
 Alleviation in Malawi, World Development, 28, 2, 347-363. 
Otañez, M.G., H.Mamudu and S.A.Glantz, 2007, ‘Global Leaf Companies Control the  
 Tobacco Market in Malawi’, Tobacco Control, 16, 261-269. 
Poulton, C., J.Kydd and D. Kabame, 2007, ‘All Africa Review of Experiences with  
 Commercial Agriculture: Case Study on Malawi Tobacco’, background paper for the  
 Competitive Commercial Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa Study (CCAA study). 
Renkow, M., D.Hallstrom and D.Karanja, 2004, ‘Rural Infrastructure, Transaction Costs and  
 Market Participation in Kenya’, Journal of Development Economics, 73, 349-367. 
Tchale, H. and J. Keyser, 2010, ‘Quantitative Value Chain Analysis, An Application to  
 Malawi’, The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 5242. 
World Bank, 2004, Diagnostic Trade Integration Study, Volume 2, Malawi, Chapter 4,  
 Tobacco Sector. 
Zant, W., 2012, ‘The Economics of Food Aid under Subsistence Farming with an Application  
 to Malawi’, Food Policy, 37, 124-141. 
49 
 
Appendix A Data and variables 
Data used, data sources and variable construction 
Annual data of smallholder agricultural production and crop area on the level of Extension 
Planning Area’s (EPAs), for the years from 2003/04 to 2009/10, are from the Agro-Economic 
Survey of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security. All production and area data pertain 
to smallholders and exclude estates. Distances between locations are calculated using standard 
Great Circle Method (for calculation see e.g. www.cpearson.com / Excel / LatLong.aspx). 
Data on latitude and longitude coordinates, required for this calculation, are from 
www.geocom.com, www.mapcrow.com and GOOGLE Earth. Data on maize prices are again 
from the Agro-Economic-Survey, and are only by district, not by EPA. Data on tobacco prices 
are either annual national (average) auction data (and, hence, do not differ between the different 
auctions) or farm gate prices, also from the Agro-Economic-Survey. Farm gate prices for 
tobacco are available for around 60 markets, but these series are not complete: we have 
constructed complete series by assuming a fixed share of farm gate prices in auction prices for 
each market. The average (median) share of farm gate price in auction price is 35.2% (33.2%). 
Finally, the series are attributed to districts and hence, and again, these data are also only by 
district and not by EPA. Annual data on rainfall in mm from around 30 meteorological stations 
are from the Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services, Blantyre. 
Aggregate data on fertilizer use are from the 2007-2008 Annual Agricultural Statistical 
Bulletin of the MoAFS. Annual aggregate fertilizer consumption by type of fertilizer is 
allocated to districts using the allocation of subsidized fertilizer packages (data also from the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security). Data on the number of households by EPA for the 
year 2007/08 are from the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, and are extrapolated to 
the years 2003/04 to 2009/10 on the basis of population by district data from the National 
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Statistical Office (NSO). Data on the number of (members of) agricultural clubs, or burley 
clubs, by EPA are from the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security.  
For descriptive purposes we use one year of auction transaction data. Auction 
transaction data were kindly made available by the Tobacco Control Commission. In 
particular we use all transactions (around 62,000) for the year 2009. Each transaction 
contains information on type of tobacco, number of bales, volume in kg, value in US$, 
district of origin and club. Also for descriptive purposes we use annual aggregate times series 
data on the tobacco sector from Tobacco Control Commission, posted on their website 
(www.tccmw.com). 
Auction data vis-à-vis production data 
How do the auction sales data from the Tobacco Control Commission compare with the 
production data from the Agro-Economic Survey of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Security? With the available data we compare national production aggregates for the crop 
seasons 2003/04 to 2009/10 with sales totals for the years 2004 to 2010 (see Figure A1). 
Additionally, we compare the district composition of production of the crop season 2008/09 
(2007/08) with the district composition of sales by origin for the year 2009 (see Figure A2). 
The comparison reveals a number of large discrepancies: the aggregates appear to differ 
substantially in 2004 and 2005, while the difference gets smaller in later years; and the 
district distribution shows large production overestimates / sales underestimates for 
Lilongwe, Mchinji and Ntchisi and large sales overestimates / production underestimates for 
Dowa, Kasungu, Mzimba and Rumphi. At this stage we do not know what explains these 
discrepancies. It is clear, however, that the often claimed upward bias in data from the Agro 
Economic Survey / Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security is not supported by the tobacco 
transaction data from auctions, collected by the Tobacco Control Commission (see Figure 
A2). 
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Figure A2 Aggregate tobacco production and total auction sales volume 
 
Source: Tobacco Control Commission and Agro Economic Survey, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
 
Figure A3 Tobacco production and auction sales volume by district 
 
Source: Tobacco Control Commission and Agro Economic Survey, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
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Appendix B 
Figure B1 Tobacco auction floors in Malawi 
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Appendix C Institutions in the tobacco commodity chain in Malawi 
The Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA) was founded in 1929 and became a registered 
trust in 1983. TAMA is financed by the tobacco growers through a levy on the auction floors. 
Its objective is to take an active role in representing tobacco growers’ interests in Malawi, to 
ensure profitable production and marketing of their tobacco through provision of such 
services as research, training, education and marketing promotion  (www.tamalawi.com, 
accessed in June 2011). TAMA has a total number of association members (tobacco growers) 
of  close to 50,000. Among a variety of activities like marketing, finance and inputs, TAMA 
runs – through their operations department – close to 100 satellite depots across the country 
to enable growers to deliver their tobacco at places near their farms. The operations 
department further coordinates tobacco haulage and tobacco re-handling through its fully 
fledged TAMA Re-handling Company. 
The Tobacco Control Commission (TCC) was established in 1938 by the Minister of 
Agriculture under the control of the Tobacco Auction Floors Act, financed by tobacco 
growers through a levy on the auction floors. The major responsibilities of TCC are: control 
and regulation of tobacco marketing in Malawi; licensing and registration of tobacco growers 
and sellers; setting product quality standards (notably defining tobacco grades and classes); 
collecting, processing and distributing data and statistics on tobacco; carrying out market 
research and dissemination of markets studies; advising the government on tobacco issues 
and promotion and expansion of tobacco sales and the growth of tobacco industry and 
enhancing its contribution to the agricultural sector and GDP, and its contribution to 
Malawi’s foreign exchange earnings (See TCC website (www.tccmw.com), accessed in June 
2011). 
Auction Holdings Limited (AHL) is the private sector company that runs the auctions. 
Tobacco Auctions Limited and Producers Warehouse Limited, the predecessors of AHL 
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whose first operations date back as early as 1936, operated in competition with each other 
until 1962, when they were amalgamated as Auction Holdings Nyasaland Limited. Following 
Malawi's Independence, the company was renamed Auction Holdings Limited in 1965 (See 
AHL website (www.ahlmw.com), accessed in June 2011). AHL currently runs operations at 
the four main tobacco auction floors (Limbe (Blantyre), Kanengo (Lilongwe), Mzuzu 
(Mzimba) and Chinkhoma (Kasungu)), together with a number of satellite auction floors, 
mini auction floors and rural markets29. In 2004 the Chinkhoma auction floor – near Kasungu 
in Central Malawi –  has started as a satellite auction floor. At all floors AHL provides 
tobacco marketing facilities and related support structures. The auction floor infrastructure 
includes large storage facilities and warehouses and after auction processing factories from 
buying companies. AHL claims to ensure that growers are paid the proceeds on their bank 
account within 24 hours after the sale. 
The National Association of Smallholder Farmers of Malawi  (NASFAM), grown out 
of the USAID funded Smallholder Agribusiness Development Project and founded in 1997, 
originally aimed at supporting and organizing smallholder tobacco production, with farmers 
clubs and associations as major organisational unit. NASFAM currently has an extension 
network that reaches over 100,000 smallholder farmers, an estimated share of 15 to 25% of 
all smallholder tobacco farmers (Jaffee, 2003; www.nasfam.org (accessed in June 2011) and 
supplies - amongst other things – insurance and transport services for transport of tobacco to 
the auction floors under the NASFAM transport program. 
                                                            
29 TCC’s tobacco market report covering the period from 1st March 2006 to 5th July 2006 states, for example: 
“Highlights of this year’s tobacco marketing season include the opening of mini auction floors at Mgode in the 
Southern region, Linyangwa and Mpasadzi in the Central region and Kabwafu in the Northern region. The mini 
floors were opened to reduce congestion on the main floors of Lilongwe, Mzuzu and Limbe, and Chinkhoma 
satellite floors. The mini floors are also there to reduce the cost of transporting tobacco to the marketing that is 
entirely borne by the growers”. 
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Appendix D 
 
Table D1 Impact estimations with placebo crop (groundnuts)  
Dependent variable:  
    natural logarithm of groundnut yield (ln(qgroundnut,i,t / agroundnut,i,t), column (1) and (2)),  
    natural logarithm of groundnut production relative to base (ln(qgroundnut,i,t / qgroundnut,i,base), column (3) and (4))  
    and natural logarithm of groundnut area relative to base (ln(agroundnut,i,t / agroundnut,i,base), column (5) and (6)) 
        all by Extension Planning Area (EPA) 
 yield production area 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(2004-2005) 0.0190 0.0531 0.2165 0.2104 0.1857 0.1753 
 (0.3) (0.8) (1.9) (1.9) (2.0) (1.9) 
I(2005-2006) -0.0297 0.0189 0.0133 0.0311 0.0688 0.0362 
 (0.4) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (0.7) (0.4) 
I(2006-2007) 0.0447 0.0664 -0.1112 -0.1145 -0.1086 -0.1393 
 (0.6) (0.9) (1.0) (1.0) (1.1) (1.5) 
I(2007-2008) 0.0679 0.0993 0.1162 0.1496 0.0737 0.0786 
 (1.0) (1.4) (1.0) (1.3) (0.8) (0.9) 
I(2008-2009) 0.0659 0.1190 0.0150 -0.0014 -0.0277 -0.0805 
 (0.9) (1.7) (0.1) (0.0) (0.3) (0.9) 
I(2009-2010) 0.1016 0.1540 0.1047 0.0777 0.0311 -0.0355 
 (1.5) (2.1) (0.9) (0.7) (0.3) (0.4) 
ln(lagged groundnut price)  -0.0086  -0.1200  -0.1009 
  (0.3)  (2.7)  (2.9) 
ln(lagged maize price)  0.2525  0.0798  -0.1334 
  (3.2)  (0.6)  (1.4) 
ln(rainfall)  0.2338  0.1055   
  (4.7)  (1.3)   
dEPA(i) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
dYEAR (t) x REG (k) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 1310 1303 1289 1284 1289 1281 
F (.) (220,1089) 15.76 
(222,1080) 
16.76 
(210,1078) 
6.85 
(212,1071) 
7.32 
(210,1078) 
4.81 
(211,1069) 
6.12 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00000 
Adjusted R2 0.7127 0.7288 0.4883 0.5109 0.3844 0.4578 
RMSE 0.23889 0.22986 0.37696 0.36781 0.31539 0.29587 
Notes – The table reports estimates of groundnut yield, production and area. Estimations are based on annual data from 
2003-04 to 2009-10 (seven years). Groundnut price and maize prices are nominal prices and are expected to have an opposite 
sign. All equations are estimated with OLS. Absolute t-statistics are given in parentheses (.) below the coefficient. Adjusted 
R2 = coefficient of determination, adjusted for degrees of freedom, and RMSE = Root Mean Squared Error. We do not 
report coefficients and t-values of the constant term and a complete set of EPA dummies and year by region dummies 
(dEPA(i), dYEAR(t) x REG(k)).  
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Appendix E 
Table E1 Sales volume by tobacco auction floor* and by district of origin, 2009 
 Sales volume (in 1000 kg) per district distribution over auctions in % per auction distribution over districts in % 
District MZZ CNK LIL LMB TOTAL MZZ CNK LIL LMB TOTAL MZZ CNK LIL LMB TOTAL 
Chitipa 2991 0.1 118 0.1 3110 96.2 0.0 3.8 0.0 100 4.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.5 
Karonga 12288 16 24 4.0 1272 96.5 1.3 1.9 0.3 100 1.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 
Rumphi 16383 469 4.0 16856 97.2 2.8 0.0 100 23.6 1.7 0.0 8.2
Nkhatabay 1530 3 2.7 1535 99.6 0.2  0.2 100 2.2 0.0  0.0 0.7 
Mzimba 34913 550 34 46 35543 98.2 1.5 0.1 0.1 100 50.2 2.0 0.1 0.1 17.2 
Nkhotakota 472 568 29 403 1472 32.1 38.6 1.9 27.4 100 0.7 2.0 0.1 0.7 0.7 
Kasungu 9228 16737 16424 1139 43528 21.2 38.5 37.7 2.6 100 13.3 60.2 30.1 2.1 21.1 
Ntchisi 415 1977 73 633 3098 13.4 63.8 2.4 20.4 100 0.6 7.1 0.1 1.2 1.5
Dowa 1361 5494 29337 1593 37786 3.6 14.5 77.6 4.2 100 2.0 19.8 53.7 2.9 18.3 
Mchinji 400 678 421 1580 3079 13.0 22.0 13.7 51.3 100 0.6 2.4 0.8 2.9 1.5 
Salima 54 45 4.9 1345 1450 3.7 3.1 0.3 92.8 100 0.1 0.2 0.0 2.5 0.7 
Lilongwe 481 1199 6364 1428 9471 5.1 12.7 67.2 15.1 100 0.7 4.3 11.7 2.6 4.6 
Dedza 4.1 22 1733 629 2388 0.2 0.9 72.6 26.3 100 0.0 0.1 3.2 1.1 1.2 
Ntcheu 7.4 4.7 13 5583 5608 0.1 0.1 0.2 99.5 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.2 2.7
Mangochi 4.8 1.8 10225 10232 0.0 0.0  99.9 100 0.0 0.0  18.6 4.9 
Machinga 2.4 1.5 2.2 8050 8056 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.7 3.9 
Balaka  1.6 0.3 1080 1082  0.1 0.0 99.8 100  0.0 0.0 2.0 0.5 
Zomba 10 2.1 9015 9027 0.1 0.0  99.9 100 0.0 0.0  16.4 4.4 
Mwanza   48 48    100.0 100    0.1 0.0 
Blantyre 5.9 3.0 3.3 390 402 1.5 0.8 0.8 96.9 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2 
Chiradzulu 13 11 6.7 2071 2102 0.6 0.5 0.3 98.6 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 1.0 
Phalombe 0.4 3.2 6429 6433 0.0 0.0  99.9 100 0.0 0.0  11.7 3.1 
Mulanje 0.7  1441 1442 0.1   99.9 100 0.0   2.6 0.7 
Thyolo   0.0 1714 1714   0.0 100.0 100   0.0 3.1 0.8 
Chikwawa 0.0 0.0 0.0 19 19 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100    0.0 0.0 
Total 69504 27788 54588 54871 206750 33.6 13.4 26.4 26.5 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: transaction data for 2009 from the Tobacco Control Commission, Malawi; * CNK = Chinkhoma; LIL = Lilongwe (Kanengo); LMB = Limbe; MZZ = Mzuzu;  
Notes – Districts of origin and auction floors are ordered from north to south and regions (north, central and south) are distinguished in the table by shading. 
